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This paper addresses the problem of finding the appropriate method for conducting empirical 
validation in agent-based (AB) models, which is often regarded as the Achilles’ heel of the AB 
approach to economic modelling. The paper has two objectives. First, to identify key issues facing 
AB economists engaged in empirical validation. Second, to critically appraise the extent to which 
alternative approaches deal with these issues. We identify a first set of issues that are common to 
both AB and neoclassical modellers and a second set of issues which are specific to AB modellers. 
This second set of issues is captured in a novel taxonomy, which takes into consideration the nature 
of the object under study, the goal of the analysis, the nature of the modelling assumptions, and the 
methodology of the analysis. Having identified the nature and causes of heterogeneity in empirical 
validation, we examine three important approaches to validation that have been developed in AB 
economics: indirect calibration, the Werker-Brenner approach, and the history-friendly approach. 
We also discuss a set of open questions within empirical validation. These include the trade-off 
between empirical support and tractability of findings, the issue of over-parameterisation, 
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 1 
1  Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide a critical guide to the alternative approaches to empirical 
validation developed in agent-based (AB) economics in recent years, and contrasts these with 
neoclassical approaches to empirical validation. Particular attention is given to key issues that face 
all those engaged in empirical validation, and to how different methodologies deal with these key 
issues. The general themes considered are: (1) the relationship between theory and empirical 
research, (2) the relationship between models and the real-world system that is being modelled, and 
(3) the way in which alternative approaches to validation deal with (1) and (2).  
 
The last two decades have seen a rapid growth in agent-based (AB) modelling in economics. Deep 
philosophical differences exist between neoclassical and AB modellers regarding the world faced 
by real-world agents and, hence, the type of models that it is useful for economists to construct. In 
fact, the interest in AB modelling
4 was stimulated by the rise of the new classical school that, in the 
late 1970s / early 1980s, became the dominant way of representing a dynamic, decentralised 
economy. AB models reject the aprioristic commitment of new classical models to individual 
hyper-rationality, continuous equilibrium, and representative agents
5. Everything in the neoclassical 
world can, in principle, be known and understood. It is often assumed that the entire set of objects 
in the world (e.g. techniques of production, or products) is known at the outset. The opposite is the 
case in the AB world. Here the set is unknown, and agents must engage in an open-ended search for 
new objects. Associated with this distinction are important differences with regards to the types of 
innovative learning and adaptation that are considered, definitions of bounded rationality, the 
treatment of heterogeneity amongst individual agents and the interaction between these individuals, 
and whether the economic system is characterised as being in equilibrium or far-from-equilibrium.  
 
AB models tend to contain the following ten features: 
 
1. A bottom-up perspective. A satisfactory account of a decentralised economy is to be addressed 
using a bottom-up perspective because aggregate properties are the outcome of micro-dynamics 
involving basic entities (agents) (Tesfatsion, 2002). This contrasts with the top-down nature of 
traditional neoclassical models, where the bottom level typically comprises a representative 
individual and is constrained by strong consistency requirements associated with equilibrium and 
hyper-rationality. 
                                                 
4 We do not aim to provide a complete survey of AB models in economics, nor to discuss the (often subtle) differences 
which characterise different research schools that have been employing AB models to study market and industry 
dynamics (e.g. evolutionary economics, agent-based computational economics, neo-Schumpeterian, and history-
friendly models). The interested reader is referred to Lane (1993a,b), Dosi and Nelson (1994), Nelson (1995), 
Silverberg and Verspagen (1995), Tesfatsion (1997, 2001b, 2002), Windrum (2004), Dawid (2005), and Pyka and 
Fagiolo (2005). Also see Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999), and Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) for a discussion of AB 
techniques in other social sciences. 
5 An alternative view (though one which we doubt would be shared by AB economists themselves) is that the AB 
approach is complementary to neoclassical economics. Departures from standard neoclassical assumptions, found in AB 
models, can be interpreted as ‘what if’, instrumentalist explorations of the space of initial assumptions. For example, 
what happens if we do not suppose hyper-rationality on the part of individuals? What if agents decide on the basis of 
bounded rationality? and so on. 
 22. Heterogeneity. Agents are (or might be) heterogeneous in almost all their characteristics. This 
can range from initial endowments and other agents’ properties, all the way through to behavioural 
rules, competencies, rationality, and computational skills. 
3. The evolving complex system (ECS) approach. Agents live in complex systems that evolve 
through time (Kirman, 1997a, 1997b). Therefore, aggregate properties are thought to emerge out of 
repeated interactions among simple entities, rather than from the consistency requirements of 
rationality and equilibrium imposed by the modeller. This focus on interactions goes hand-in-hand 
with a bottom-up approach to systems modelling. Higher-level economic phenomena and 
structures, it is argued, are the product of subtle differences within a heterogeneous agent 
population and the local interactions that occur between individual agents. The higher level 
phenomena that emerge will differ as a consequence of the interactions that occur between the 
individual members, and subtle differences that exist within the heterogeneous population. This has 
important implications for methodological practice. One cannot, it is argued, deduce macro 
behaviour from the behaviour of an ‘average’ or ‘representative’ individual (Kirman, 1989, 1992; 
Forni and Lippi, 1997). For example, one cannot understand the collective rationality and operation 
of firms and consumers through the study of an individual firm or consumer. Equally, one is unable 
to derive collective rationality in economic phenomena, such as the formation of strategic alliances, 
through the construction of abstract representative agents. Rather, macro phenomena are a product 
of the interactions of heterogeneous firms and consumers. Complex dynamics of the macro 
structure arise, even if each individual follows a very simple behavioural rule. Hence, AB models 
highlight the heterogeneity of firms and consumers, the rules that govern their individual behaviour, 
and the rules governing their interactions (Lane, 1993a, 1993b). 
4. Non-linearity. The interactions that occur in AB models are inherently non-linear (Silverberg et 
al., 1988). Local interactions between individual agents are non-linear. Additionally, non-linear 
feedback loops exist between micro and macro levels. A model may contain a number of such 
feedback loops, some of which are positive and some negative. The focus is on the self-organizing 
properties that emerge through these feedback loops. As Silverberg et al. (1988) observe, in 
economics we see “complex interdependent dynamical systems unfolding in historical, i.e. 
irreversible, time, economic agents, who make decision today the correctness of which will only be 
revealed considerably later, are confronted with irreducible uncertainty and holistic interactions 
between each other and with aggregate variables” (Silverberg et al., 1988, p.1036, italics in 
original). Thus, the emergence property is linked to the presence of multi-scale effects in AB 
models. Small-scale interactions produce a ‘field’ at the macro level that in turn influences and 
modifies activity at the local, micro level. 
5. Direct (endogenous) interactions. Agents interact directly. The decisions undertaken today by an 
agent directly depends, through adaptive expectations, on the past choices made by other agents in 
the population (Fagiolo, 1998; Windrum and Birchenhall, 1998). These may contain structures, 
such as subgroups of agents or local networks. In such structures, members of the population are in 
some sense closer to certain individuals in the socio-economic space than others. These interaction 
structures may themselves endogenously change over time, since agents can strategically decide 
who to interact with according to the expected payoffs. When combined with heterogeneity and 
bounded rationality, it is likely that aggregation processes will be non-trivial, non-linear and, 
sometimes, will generate the emergence of structurally new objects (Lane, 1993a, 1993b). 
6. Bounded rationality. The environment in which real-world economic agents live is too complex 
for hyper-rationality to be a viable simplifying assumption (Dosi et al., 2005). It is suggested that 
one can, at most, impute to agents some local and partial (both in time and space) principles of 
 3rationality, e.g. myopic optimisation rules. More generally, agents are assumed to behave as 
boundedly rational entities with adaptive expectations.  
7. The nature of learning. Neoclassical models are interested in learning that leads to improvements 
in allocative efficiency. Two types of learning are investigated: inferential learning based on a 
Bayesian updating of decision rules where there is asymmetric or imperfect information, and 
action/strategy learning (notably in evolutionary games). In each case, learning is conducted within 
an equilibrium framework, the focus of the analysis is inter-temporal coordination and, where the 
problem arises, ways of dealing with multiple equilibria. Risk is probabilistic in these models. AB 
models engage in the open-ended search of dynamically changing environments. This is due to two 
factors. The first is the ongoing introduction of novelty and the generation of new patterns of 
behaviour, which are themselves a force for learning and adaptation. Agents are not initially 
endowed with an understanding of the underlying structure of the environment in which they 
operate but must develop a representation of the underlying structure. The introduction of radical 
innovation makes the task more difficult since the introduction of new objects alters this underlying 
structure and, hence, the payoffs associated with alternative actions. The second factor 
underpinning open-ended search is the complexity of the interactions between heterogeneous agents 
(5 above).  
8. ‘True’ dynamics. Partly as a consequence of adaptive expectations (i.e. agents observe the past 
and form expectations about the future on the basis of the past), AB models are characterised by 
true, non-reversible, dynamics: the state of the system evolves in a path-dependent manner 
(Marengo and Willinger, 1997). 
9. Endogenous and persistent novelty. Socio-economic systems are inherently non-stationary. 
There is the ongoing introduction of novelty in economic systems and the generation of new 
patterns of behaviour, which are themselves a force for learning and adaptation. Hence, agents face 
‘true (Knightian) uncertainty’ (see Knight, 1921) and are only able to partially form expectations 
on, for instance, technological outcomes. At the same time, firms deliberately introduce new objects 
(innovative products and processes) into their competitive environment in order to alter the 
underlying structure, i.e. to alter the payoffs associated with alternative actions, and even to change 
the rules of the game in their favour. Hence, new technologies are introduced into open-ended 
technological spaces, and payoffs to R&D are non-static and cannot be known ex ante (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1988). This not simply because agents face problems with respect to collecting 
and processing information, but the sheer algorithmic complexity of the problem they face, and 
their ability to define preferences over expected actions, events, and outcomes. As a consequence, 
agents face the extremely difficult task of learning and adapting themselves in turbulent and 
endogenously changing environments. On this basis, AB researchers have argued that assumptions 
of individual hyper-rationality coupled with rational expectations are inappropriate starting points 
for modelling. 
10.  Selection-based market mechanisms. Agents are typically selected against (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982).  Most obviously, the goods and services produced by competing firms are selected 
by consumers.  The selection criteria that are used may themselves be complex and span a number 
of dimensions. Turbulence in industry dynamics can be created through successive rounds of firm 
entry and exit (Saviotti, and Pyka, 2004; Windrum and Birchenhall, 2005; Windrum, 2005). 
 
AB researchers have enjoyed significant success over the last 20 years. The models that have been 
developed indicate the viability and vitality of an alternative to mainstream neoclassical economics. 
 4Indeed, mainstream economists have recognised the significance of the AB critique, and have 
reacted by extending their own modelling framework to incorporate (certain) aspects of 
heterogeneity, bounded rationality, learning, increasing returns, and technological change. Another 
sign of the vitality of the AB community has been the development of its own specialist 
international journals and annual conferences, and the diffusion of its ideas to other areas such as 
management science, political science and to policy circles.  
 
While orthodox economists have taken on board, and responded to, aspects of the AB critique, they 
have not been moved to join the AB camp. There are many possible explanations for this, but an 
important aspect, recognised by AB modellers themselves, concerns the perceived lack of 
robustness in AB modelling. This threatens the AB research enterprise as a whole. Four key 
problem areas were identified in a recent conference and special workshop attended by the authors
6. 
We discuss each of these in turn. 
 
First, the neoclassical community has consistently developed a core set of theoretical models and 
applied these to a range of research areas. The AB community has not done this. Indeed, the sheer 
diversity of alternative AB models put forward over the last 20 years is striking. There is little or no 
understanding of the connection amongst the set of highly heterogeneous models that have been 
developed. Take, for example, the many types of models that have been put forward to explain 
technological diffusion. What are the deep, fundamental relationships between sand pile models, 
Polya urn models, dynamic learning models such as genetic algorithms, evolutionary games, and 
network models (e.g. small worlds models)? The simple answer is ‘nobody knows’!  
 
A second, related set of issues concerns a lack of comparability between the models that have been 
developed. Not only do the models have different theoretical content but they seek to explain 
strikingly different phenomena. Where they do seek to explain similar phenomena, little or no in-
depth research has been undertaken to compare and evaluate their relative explanatory performance. 
Rather, models are viewed in isolation of one another, and validation involves examining the extent 
to which the output traces generated by a particular model approximates one or more ‘stylised facts’ 
drawn from empirical research. The problem is compounded by the high degrees of freedom in AB 
models. Not only do AB models contain highly non-linear, recursive interactions and feedbacks, but 
they tend to have many dimensions and, hence, degrees of freedom. With many degrees of freedom, 
almost any simulation output can be generated by an AB model. The problem is further 
compounded when the empirical phenomena that are specified as stylised facts are themselves 
rather general in nature. Under these conditions, comparisons with stylised facts not only represent 
a weak test for the validity of individual models, they fail to provide a strong methodological basis 
for comparing competing models. 
 
This leads us to a third set of issues. These concern the lack of standard techniques for constructing 
and analysing AB models. It has been argued that developing a set of commonly accepted protocols 
for AB model building would benefit the profession (Leombruni, 2002; Richiardi, 2003). This 
would address, for instance, issues such as how and when sensitivity analysis (over the space of 
initial conditions and parameters) should be conducted, how one should deal with non-ergodicity in 
underlying stochastic processes, and how one should interpret, in terms of real-world time, the 
timing and lag structures that modellers typically build into their AB models. 
 
                                                 
6 At a special session on ‘Methodological Issues in Empirically-based Simulation Modelling’, hosted by Windrum and 
Fagiolo at the 4
th EMAEE conference, Utrecht, May 2005, and at the ACEPOL 2005 International Workshop on 
‘Agent-Based Models for Economic Policy Design’, Bielefeld, July 2005.  
 5The fourth, and final, set of issues concerns the problematic relationship between AB models and 
empirical data. As well as there being diversity with respect to the process of constructing AB 
models, fundamental differences exist in the ways researchers conduct empirical validation, and the 
methodological of AB researchers. Key areas of debate include: Is a ‘realist’ methodology 
appropriate? Why should empirical validation be the primary basis for accepting or rejecting a 
model? Do other tests of model validation exist than the reproduction of stylised facts? If we do 
proceed down the path of empirical validation, then how should one relate and calibrate the 
construction of parameters, initial conditions, and stochastic variability in AB models to the existing 
empirical data? Which classes of empirically observed objects do we actually want to replicate? 
How dependable are the micro and macro stylised facts to be replicated? To what extent can we 
truly consider output traces to be stylised facts or, alternatively, counterfactuals? What are the 
consequences, for the explanative power of a model, if the stylised facts are actually ‘unconditional 
objects’ that only indicate properties of stationary distributions and, hence, do not provide 
information on the dynamics of the stochastic processes that generated them?  
 
Before moving on, we note that we have implicitly assumed that a high degree of heterogeneity is 
problematic. Heterogeneity makes it difficult to compare alternative models that seek to explain the 
same phenomenon, makes it difficult to advance a new, alternative paradigm, and to contrast it with 
the existing neoclassical paradigm. Having a small set of core models, developed by researchers 
over time using a (few) commonly accepted protocol(s) for model building and empirical validation 
would, it is suggested, be better for the community of AB researchers. It could, however, be argued 
that a high degree of heterogeneity is, initially at least, commensurate with Kuhn’s (1962) 
discussion of the formation of new paradigms. Heterogeneity and flexibility are a consequence of a 
high degree of scientific debate and dissent on how best to proceed with the development of a new 
paradigm, and so is a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of a more codified AB paradigm. 
Further, it should be remembered that a degree of heterogeneity and dissent exists within the 
neoclassical community, and plays a necessary role in maintaining the vitality of that research 
paradigm. Still, while a degree of heterogeneity is beneficial, this must be balanced against the 
benefits of establishing a core set of models and modelling techniques that define a research 
paradigm, and are the focus of a practicing community that adheres to, and develops, a coherent 
research paradigm. 
 
As previously stated, the focus of this paper focuses on the relationship between AB models and 
empirical data. The aim is to provide a critical overview of how AB modellers have been tackling 
the issue of empirical validation. As noted, a strongly heterogeneous set of approaches can be found 
in the AB literature. An important (and novel) contribution of the paper is a taxonomy that maps the 
different dimensions of the empirical validation approaches found in AB models. We shall draw 
attention to the generic nature of the empirical validation issues.
7 That is to say, neoclassical 
modellers face these issues just as much as AB modellers do. How they are dealt with may, of 
course, differ between the two communities but the issues are nevertheless the same. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodological basis of empirical 
validation, i.e. the comparison of discrete-time models with empirical data. The section begins with 
a discussion of the core issues of empirical validation faced by all modellers. Having identified 
these core issues, we consider how these were dealt with by the Haavelmo-Cowles approach. The 
discussion clearly identifies the rationale for empirical validation, and simultaneously highlights the 
methodological difficulties involved in using empirical validation to develop and asses the quality 
                                                 
7 The very meaning of empirical validation is the subject of lively debate, see Bailey (1988).  
 6of discrete-time models. This paves the way for a discussion of how, having broken the consensus 
of the Haavelmo-Cowles approach, a number of competing approaches have been developed by 
neoclassical economists.  
 
Section 3 starts the discussion of how empirical validation is carried out in AB models. This is also 
conducted in very diverse ways. The heterogeneity of approaches, we suggest, is due to two factors. 
First, AB modellers face a whole class of problems associated with their modelling non-linearities, 
stochastic dynamics, non-trivial interactions among agents, feedbacks  from the micro to the macro 
level, and so on. The second factor is the diverse structural content of AB models, and the very 
different ways in which AB models are analysed. We present a novel taxonomy of AB models 
which maps out the key areas in which AB researchers differ.  These are the nature of the object 
under study (i.e. of the stylised fact(s) under analysis), the goal of the analysis (in-sample vs. out-of-
sample), the nature of the main modelling assumptions (e.g. parameters, decision rules, interaction, 
and timing), and the methodology of the analysis (i.e. sensitivity analyses). Following this, section 4 
surveys the three key approaches to empirical validation in AB economics. These are the indirect 
calibration approach (section 4.1), the Werker-Brenner approach to empirical calibration (section 
4.2), and the history-friendly approach (section 4.3)
8. Having highlighted the pros and cons of each 
approach, we conclude by discussing some outstanding issues for empirically-oriented AB 
modellers (section 5).  
 
2  The methodological basis of empirical validation: comparing discrete-time 
models with empirical data 
 
In the first part of this section (2.1), we discuss a set of core empirical validation issues that are 
common to all modellers (neoclassical and AB alike). As we shall see, despite neoclassical 
economists having a more codified methodology than AB researchers, a lack of consensus exists on 
how best to deal with the problems that arise from these issues. Interestingly, until the 1970s, there 
was a large consensus in econometrics on how to build and test an empirical model. This consensus 
was built around the Haavelmo-Cowles approach. We examine, in section 2.2, this approach, the 
Lucas and Sims critiques of the approach, and four alternative approaches to empirical validation 
developed by mainstream neoclassical economists as a consequence of the critiques. Having 
identified the core issues and analysed the responses of neoclassical economics, we are able to 
situate the responses of AB modellers (section 4). 
 
 
2.1  Core issues of empirical validation 
 
Let us consider the typical situation faced by any empirically-grounded economist attempting to 
replicate and/or explain a set of stylised facts. The point of departure is almost always a set of 
empirically observed data (e.g. panel data) whose generic form is: 
 
                                                 
8 We will not express judgments about the performance of the different approaches, and will not enter into deep 
epistemological discussions about, for example, the meaning of ‘cause and effect’, ‘reality’, or ‘models’. The interested 
reader is directed to Aruka (2001), Blaug (1980), Brenner and Murmann (2003), Cowan and Rizzo (1996), Downward 
et al. (2002), Feyerabend (1975), Hollis (1994), Mäki (1994), and McCloskey (1995) for introductory discussions of 
crucial methodological problems in social sciences. 
 7(z)i ={ zi,t, t = t0, …, t1}, i∈I. 
 
Here the set I refers to a population of agents (e.g. firms and households) whose behaviour has been 
observed across the finite set of time-periods {t0, …, t1} and refers to a list of, say, K variables 
contained in the vector z. Whenever agent-level observations are not available, the modeller has 
access to the K-vector of aggregate time-series: 
 
Z = { Zt, t = t0, …, t1}, 
 
which can be obtained by summing the K micro-economic variables zi,t over i∈I. In both cases, the 
observed dataset(s) generate(s) a number of ‘stylised facts’ or statistical properties that the modeller 
is seeking to explain.  
 
The datasets (z)i and/or Z are the unique outcome of an unknown, real-world data-generation 
process (rwDGP). Due to the impossibility of knowing the ‘true’ model of the world, we can think 
of the rwDGP as a very complicated, multi-parameter, stochastic process that governs the 
generation of a unique realisation which we can actually observe. The goal of the modeller is then 
to provide a sufficiently good ‘approximation’ of the rwDGP through a model. The model will 
contain a simplified data-generation process, the model-DGP (mDGP). This mDGP should provide 
a meaningful explanation of the causal mechanisms underlying the observed stylised facts, as well 
as a good representation of the observed data. Therefore, the empirical validation of a model is, in 
essence, a process of backward induction in which the modeller tries to evaluate the extent to which 
their mDGP is a good representation of the rwDGP
9. 
 
As mentioned above, there are methodological issues associated with empirical validation that 
concern all the natural and social sciences, and which remain the focus of intense debate in the 
philosophy of science. We have, however, identified a set of core issues that relate to, and assist in 
explaining, the different approaches to empirical validation found in discrete-time-based economic 
modelling. Neither neoclassical economists nor AB modellers have precise and definite strategies to 
address these issues. But it is possible to assess important differences in the methodological 
strategies carried out by the two approaches. We will deal with this task in the subsequent sections. 
First we need to identify and elucidate the core issues.  
 
1. Concretisation vs. isolation. Faced with the essential complexity of the world, scientific (not only 
economic) models proceed by simplifying and focusing on the relationships between a very limited 
number of variables. Is it possible to model all the different elements of the rwDGP? How can we 
possibly ‘know’ all the different elements of the rwDGP? Leading economists have in the past 
expressed serious doubts about whether we can expect to have models that are fully concretised.
 10 
That is, models that contain all the possible variables that have an influence on the object under 
examination. Another way to look at the problem is via complexity theory. Consider the extreme 
case of randomness in the behaviour of some elements under investigation. Randomness, as defined 
by algorithmic complexity theory (associated with Kolmogorov and Chaitin), refers to the degree of 
                                                 
9 One may notice that this account (or meta-model) of empirical validation reveals a realist bias since we assume there 
is a set of causal mechanisms ‘out there’ in the world which need to be explained, and explanation can be achieved 
through the construction of models. Note that an instrumentalist may also agree that there exists a set of causal 
mechanisms that generate the data we observe. What (s)he denies is that models are supposed to represent or describe 
such causal mechanisms. 
10 John Stuart Mill and John Maynard Keynes are the most cited examples. The reader is referred to Janssen (1994) for a 
clear discussion. 
 8complexity of a string of binary elements in some well-defined computational procedure. Roughly 
speaking, the longer the computer program (or ideal Turing machine) needed to reproduce a given 
string, the more complex is that program. If the string is so complex that the length of the 
computational description approaches the length of the string, the string is deemed ‘random’ (see 
Mirowski, 1998). This demonstrates that, in a highly complex world, a fully concretised model 
would be a one-to-one mapping of the world itself! Thus, economists usually agree that models 
should isolate some causal mechanisms, by abstracting from certain entities that may have an 
impact on the phenomenon under examination (see Gibbard and Varian, 1978; Mäki, 1992 and 
2005; Janssen, 1994). A series of open questions remain. How can we assess that the mechanisms 
isolated by the model resemble the mechanisms operating in the world? In order to isolate the 
mechanisms, can we make assumptions ‘contrary to fact’, that is, assumptions that contradict the 
knowledge we have of the situation under discussion? This brings us to the second core issue of 
empirical validation. 
 
2. As-if assumptions. As Mäki (2003) suggests, two kinds of as if assumptions can be found in 
economic modelling. One says ‘phenomena behave as if forces that are isolated in a model are real’, 
the other says ‘phenomena behave as if certain ideal conditions were met: conditions under which 
only those real forces that are isolated in a model are active’ (see Mäki 2005, p. 501). While the first 
position is instrumentalist, the second is consistent with realism. Realism, roughly speaking claims 
that theoretical entities ‘exist in the reality’, independent of the act of inquiry, representation or 
measurement.
11 On the contrary, instrumentalism maintains that theoretical entities are solely 
instruments for predictions and not true descriptions of the world. A radical instrumentalist is not 
much concerned with issues of empirical validation, in the sense that (s)he is not much interested in 
making the model resemble mechanisms operating in the world.
 12 His/her sole goal is prediction. 
Indeed, a (consistent) instrumentalist is usually more willing than a realist to ‘play’ with the 
assumptions and parameters of the model in order to get better predictions. While the neoclassical 
paradigm has sometimes endorsed instrumentalist statements à la Friedman (1953), it has never 
allowed a vast range of assumption adjustments in order to get better predictions. In this sense it 
fails to be consistent with its instrumentalist background . 
 
3.  Methodological pluralism vs.  strong apriorism. Methodological pluralism claims that the 
complexity of the subject studied by economics and the boundedness of our scientific 
representations implies the possibility of different levels of analysis, different kinds of assumptions 
to be used in model-building, and legitimacy of different methodological positions. A great variety 
of ‘pluralist’ positions is conceivable. They range from the extreme cases of epistemological 
anarchism (Feyerabend, 1975) to scientific pluralist positions that allow the possibility of different 
methods of investigation but which have to be eventually integrated (Mitchell, 2003). Scientific 
pluralism opposes the strong apriorism that can be traced in many neoclassical approaches to 
empirical validation (as we will show in section 2.2). Apriorism is a commitment to a set of a priori 
assumptions. A certain degree of commitment to a set of priori assumptions are normal in science, 
and they correspond to what Lakatos (1970) called the ‘hard core’  assumptions of a research 
program. But strong apriorism is the commitment to a set of a priori (possibly contrary to the facts) 
assumptions that are never exposed to empirical validation (e.g. general equilibrium and perfect 
rationality). Theory is considered prior to data and it is denied the possibility of interpreting data 
without theoretical presuppositions. Typically, strong apriorist positions do not allow a model to be 
changed in the face of anomalies, and encourages the researcher to produce ad hoc excuses 
                                                 
11 Indeed several possible qualifications of realism are possible (see Mäki, 1998). 
12 The reader is referred to Moneta (2005) for an account of realist and anti-realist positions about causality in 
econometrics. 
 9whenever a refutation is encountered. Lakatos (1970) dubbed the research programs involved with 
such positions as ‘degenerating’. 
 
4 . Analytical solvability vs. descriptive accuracy. We said in (1) that fully concretised models are 
impossible to build in a complex world. They are not useful either. Indeed, what is the point of 
modelling? Models serve two purposes in modern science: representing and intervening (Morrison 
and Morgan, 1999). In other words, models are useful, either for increasing our understanding of 
the world or of a theory, or because they provide the kind of information that allows us to intervene 
in the world, or both. As Nigel Gilbert (2004) points out, a model is like a map, and “a large scale 
map that shows every house is not much use for crossing a city” (Gilbert 2004, p. 403). There exists 
a basic trade-off between analytical tractability and descriptive accuracy that is faced by all 
theoreticians seeking to model markets and other economic systems. Indeed, the more accurate and 
consistent is our knowledge about reality with respect to assumptions, and the more numerous the 
number of parameters in a model, the higher is the risk of failing to analytically solve the model. By 
contrast, the more abstract and simplified the model, the more analytically tractable it is. The 
neoclassical paradigm comes down strongly on the side of analytical tractability. 
 
5. The identification / under-determination problem. In the philosophy of science, there are various 
views on how one can give empirical support to a hypothesis or theoretical statement.
13 Regardless 
of which theory of confirmation one endorses, one must face the problem that different models can 
be consistent with the data that is used for empirical validation. The issue is known in the 
philosophy of science as the ‘under-determination of theory with respect to data.’ In econometrics, 
the same observation has been formalised and labelled ‘the identification problem.’ As Haavelmo 
(1944) noted, it is impossible for statistical inference to decide between hypotheses that are 
observationally equivalent. He suggested specifying an econometric model in such a way that 
(thanks to restrictions derived from economic theory) the identification problem does not arise. In 
section 2.2 we will scrutinise how the problem of identification has been addressed in the 
econometric methodology associated with the neoclassical paradigm.  
 
6. The Duhem-Quine thesis. A second source of indeterminacy besets the relationship between 
theoretical statements and data. The Duhem-Quine thesis (developed in philosophy of science) 
observes that it is not possible to test and falsify a single hypothesis in isolation.  This is because a 
hypothesis is inevitably tied to other hypotheses – the auxiliary hypotheses. Auxiliary hypotheses 
typically include background knowledge, rules of inference, and experimental design that cannot be 
disentangled from the hypothesis we want to test. Thus, if a particular hypothesis is found to be in 
conflict with the evidence, we cannot reject the hypothesis with certainty.  As shown by Sawyer et 
al. (1997), hypothesis testing in economics is further complicated by the approximate nature of 
theoretical hypotheses. The error in approximation, as well as the less systematic causes disturbing 
the causal mechanism object of modelling, constitutes an auxiliary hypothesis of typically unknown 
dimension. For example, in time-series econometric models a distinction is made between ‘signal’ 
(which captures the causal mechanisms object of interest) and ‘noise’ (accounted by the error 
terms). But it may be the case, as pointed out by Valente (2005), that noises are stronger than 
signals, and that the mechanisms involved undergo several or even continuous structural changes. 
Econometricians have adopted sophisticated tests which are robust to variations in the auxiliary 
hypotheses (see, for example, Leamer 1978). Nonetheless, the Duhem-Quine thesis still undermines 
                                                 
13 The main theories of confirmation can be divided in probabilistic theories of confirmation, in which evidence in 
favour of an hypothesis is evidence that increases its probability, and nonprobabilistic theories of confirmation, 
associated with the names of Popper, Fisher, Neyman and Pearson. The reader is referred to Howson (2000). 
 10strong apriorist methodologies that do not check the robustness of the empirical results under 
variations of background assumptions.  
 
2.2 Empirical Validation in Neoclassical Economics 
Neoclassical economics has always been concerned with the relationship between theoretical 
models and data. Hence, issues (1), (2), (5), and (6), in particular, have been hotly debated by 
neoclassical economists. Particularly famous are the ‘measurement-without-theory’ debate between 
Koopmans and Vining (see Hendry and Morgan, 1995) and the discussion of as-if assumptions by 
Friedman (1953). Notwithstanding differences between individual neoclassical economists, a 
consensus on modelling and empirical validation existed from the 1930s to the 1970s. The 
consensus was built on the work of the Cowles Commission in the 1930s and on the work of 
Haavelmo (1944). The consensus  broke down following the Lucas critique and the Sims critique. 
In 2.2.1 we explore the basis of the Haavelmo-Cowles approach and the Lucas and Sims critiques. 
In 2.2.2 we discuss  the alternative methodological approaches that have been developed in post 
Haavelmo-Cowles.  
2.2.1 The Haavelmo-Cowles Approach 
 
The Haavelmo-Cowles approach suggests that the real-world DGP is constituted by causal 
relationships, which have three characteristics. First, they are stochastic, in the sense that each 
variable is determined by a composite of steadily acting (exact) plus random influences. The 
rwDGP can thus be represented by a model DGP, comprising a system of equations, in which the 
systematic factors are the dependent variables (regressors), and the disturbing elements are 
accounted for by the error terms. Such terms follow a joint probability distribution, which is well-
defined if the system is properly specified. Second, causal relationships are autonomous, in the 
sense that the systematic relations will not break down when external conditions change. Third, 
causal relationships are simultaneous. Therefore, the economy as a whole can be characterised as a 
Walrasian general equilibrium system in which “everything depends upon everything else” 
(Haavelmo 1944, p. 22)
14.  
 
A key issue addressed by Haavelmo- Cowles is the identification problem. The question faced by 
the Haavelmo-Cowles programme can be rephrased as following: how do we identify (among the 
possibly infinite theoretical models) the theoretical model whose DGP corresponds to the DGP of 
the real-world economic system? Haavelmo (1944) formalised the identification problem, showing 
the number of algebraic restrictions that one has to impose to an econometric model in order to 
identify it. The solution pursued by the Haavelmo-Cowles program was that such restrictions had to 
be derived from economic theory. The theory in consideration was Keynesian theory, filtered by a 
neoclassical synthesis that introduced the Walrasian notion of general equilibrium
15. The object of 
the Haavelmo-Cowles program was more general, however. It did not explicitly specify which 
theory one had to obtain the restrictions. The crucial issue was that restrictions had to be derived 
from economic theory. 
 
                                                 
14 Since simultaneity is simply the effect of aggregation, one-way causal relationships within the various sectors of the 
economy are not ruled out (Haavelmo 1944, p. 22). 
15 The neoclassical synthesis was formalised by Hicks (1937) and Modigliani (1944), and empirically tested within 
large-scale macro-econometric models developed by Klein (1964). 
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against empirical data. Thus, model validation and selection between competing theoretical models 
was not the starting point.  Instead, it assumed that a generally accepted body of economic theory 
already existed. Given this, data was to be used to measure the strength of the causal given by that 
body of established theory. Still, Hoover (1994, 2006) points out that this methodology is open to 
alternative interpretations. Koopmans, in his debate with Vining about the possibility (denied by 
Koopmans) of ‘measurement without theory’, demonstrated what he calls a strong apriorist view 
(Hoover (1994). With strong apriorism one considers theory to exist prior to data, denies the 
possibility of interpreting data without theoretical presuppositions. Econometric models have to be 
built imposing restrictions derived from a well-articulated theory, which is accepted a priori. Hence, 
the purspose of econometrics is measurement, not validation or discovery. This view of theory-
laden data is strictly connected to the Duhem-Quine thesis. Hoover (2006) observes that this strong 
aprioristic position “places the empiricist in a vicious circle: how do we obtain empirically justified 
theory if empirical observation can only take place on the supposition of a true background 
theory?”. 
 
The position of Haavelmo himself was very different to Koopmans. Although Haavelmo also 
maintained that empirical investigations should be founded on a priori theoretical restrictions, he 
favoured the statistical testing of theories in order to change and improve our a priori beliefs. Thus 
he endorsed a view of econometrics that Hoover (1994) calls weak apriorism. This  recognises the 
need for an interplay of theoretical models and empirical data, and the possibility of empirically 
validating the apriori assumptions used in a model. 
 
The Haavelmo-Cowles approach was subjected to two major critiques; the first by Lucas, the 
second by Sims. Let us consider each in turn. Lucas (1976) claims that the structural parameters, 
identified using the Haavelmo-Cowles approach, are not stable under a change of economic policy 
regime. In Haavelmo’s terminology, the causal relationships measured by large-scale econometric 
models are not autonomous. This is because Keynesian models did not take into account the fact 
that people hold rational expectations, which lead them to change their behaviour as soon as the 
intervention takes place, in order to take advantage of the new policy regime. Consequently, large-
scale econometric models using restrictions derived from Keynesian macroeconomics cannot be 
employed for policy evaluation. If the estimated models are used to implement economic policy 
actions in a systematic way, individual agents will adapt their behaviour to get the maximum 
advantage from the new policy. The estimated equations, originally used to predict the effects of the 
new policy, no longer hold (as a consequence of individuals changing their behaviour), and the 
policy will not have the intended effect.  
 
It is important to recognise that the focus of the Lucas Critique was not the Haavelmo-Cowles 
understanding of the relationship between theory and modelling, but the Keynesian foundations that 
had been used to construct large-scale econometric models. Lucas called for the construction of 
models that used micro-founded behavioural principles. He believed that this would ensure 
structural relations that are invariant to changes in policy could be identified. These principles were 
the utility functions of representative consumers, the production functions of representative firms, 
and hyper-rational behaviours (and expectations). Further, these should be set within an equilibrium 
framework in which there is continuous short- and long-run market-clearing. This is the basis of the 
‘new classical macroeconomics’ (NCM). 
 
The critique put forward by Sims (1980) is more radical and is directed at the method of 
identification pursued by Haavelmo-Cowles. His critique is two-fold. First, the Haavelmo-Cowles 
 12approach encourages the imposition of an extremely large number of restrictions. This is not done 
on the basis of sound economic theory, institutional or factual knowledge. It is a consequence of the 
need to have enough restrictions to secure identification. Second, the method for theoretical 
restrictions for identification is itself not well-grounded: economic relations cannot be identified in 
principle. The interdependencies are so numerous that each variable should appear in each equation. 
According to Sims, we should ‘let the data speak’ to see what can be learned from macroeconomic 
data without imposing theoretical restrictions (at least as far as the estimation step is concerned). 
 
 
2.2.2 Beyond the Haavelmo-Cowles Approach 
 
The impact of the Lucas and Sims critiques on neoclassical economics has been dramatic. They 
broke the consensus built around the Haavelmo-Cowles approach (Favero, 2001). In the fall-out, 
four competing econometric methodologies have been developed: (i) the structural modelling 
approach, (ii) vector autoregressive models (VARs), (iii) calibration, and the (iv) London School of 
Economics (LSE) approach. We shall now briefly discuss how each of these competing approaches 
addresses the key issues of empirical validation. 
 
The NCM school was deeply concerned – at least in the beginning – with the relationship between 
theoretical data and models. Indeed, its origins lay in a search for an explanation to the empirical 
phenomena of stagflation experienced by western economies in the 1970s. NCM sought a ‘sound 
theoretical and econometric’ alternative to Keynesian macroeconometric models (Lucas and 
Sargent, 1979). The founders of NCM initially supplemented economic theory with the rational 
expectation hypothesis. Subsequently, Hansen and Sargent (1980) developed the ‘structural 
modelling approach’. The structural model to be identified was invariably a representative agent 
model in which a single agent, characterised by a utility function (usually Cobb-Douglas), 
consumes one type of good and lives for an infinite time. All products and markets are perfectly 
competitive, and the agent has rational expectations. Using this theoretical framework, a set of 
identifiable equations is derived. These are estimated using the econometrics of simultaneous 
systems developed by Haavelmo-Cowles. This is particularly important. Methodologically, the 
Hansen-Sargent approach to empirical validation does not deviate from Haavelmo-Cowles - Hansen 
and Sargent put theory before data and are strongly aprioristic. The important practical (not 
methodological) difference is that NCM theory has replaced Keynesian theory as the theoretical 
basis of econometrics. 
 
Sims’s (1980) critique of Haavelmo-Cowles led him to develop the VAR approach as an alternative 
to structural modelling. This approach seeks to examine macroeconomic data without imposing 
restrictions. For this reason, the VAR approach solely uses unrestricted, reduced-form equations. 
Each variable is assumed to be endogenous, and is regressed on lagged values of itself, and on 
lagged values of all other variables. Sims (1982) argues that the VAR approach is immune to the 
Lucas critique because policy action involves the implementation of a fixed or slowly changing 
rule, with agents forming probability distributions over a range of possible policy stances. 
Exogenous shocks embody all surprises and innovations to the information set of economic agents. 
VAR models have been shown to be extremely efficient instruments for summarising the statistical 
properties of economic time series data. However, they cannot be used for policy evaluation. An 
estimated VAR is a reduced form model and, hence, cannot say anything about causal relations.  
 
Methodologically, the VAR approach appears to be pluralist, even a-theoretical, with its desire to 
‘let the data speak for itself’. Certainly, the suggested use of a priori restrictions, independent of 
 13theory, has been heavily criticised as arbitrary and advocating a program of a-theoretical empirical 
macroeconomics (see, for example, Cooley and Le Roy, 1985). However, as our discussion of the 
Duhem-Quine thesis highlighted (point 5 in section 2.1), an apparently ‘theory free’ model will 
nevertheless contain a set of related, auxiliary hypotheses that represent a set of interconnected and 
mutually supporting theories. Notably, VARs invariably contain basic assumptions of general 
equilibrium, perfect rationality, and perfect aggregation. So, while it may be that a set of theoretical 
restrictions are not imposed at the point of estimation, the collection of stylised facts through VARs 
is not an independent exercise uninformed by neoclassical theory.
16  
 
A third approach, the ‘calibration approach’, can be considered an attempt to solve the trade-off 
between  a priori and a-theoretical approaches. It  was originally developed as a method to 
empirically assess real business cycle (RBC) models (Kydland and Prescott, 1982). The approach 
appeals to the principle that a theory is better supported when validated on information that is not 
used in its formulation. According to this approach, a theoretical model does not need to fit the data 
according to criteria dictated by statistical theory,. Indeed, the model could easily be rejected since 
it is built on a very idealised set of assumptions. Consequently, the model does not take into account 
all possible contingencies related to the deep structure of the rwDGP. Knowledge of these 
contingencies  is essential for policy. The presence of such disturbing factors, unaccounted for in 
the model but present in reality, would deform parameter estimates. Hence, the model needs to be 
calibrated. A model is calibrated when its parameters are not estimated in the context of its own 
model, but are picked from unrelated empirical micro-econometric investigations, and/or are chosen 
to guarantee that a simulated model matches some particular, unrelated features of historical data 
that are drawn from macroeconomic data (e.g. national accounts).  
 
Once calibrated, the model is validated through simulation. A model is validated if its simulated 
outputs match the moments of the data. In real business cycles (RBC) models, the test of a model’s 
ability to capture business-cycle behaviour is not its fit to some historical time series (which is only 
one of many possible realisations), but its ability to characterise the distribution from which a 
particular real-world realisation is drawn (Hoover 1995b). The model is further validated by looking 
at the stylised facts obtained by a VAR analysis of the macroeconomic time series. The model is 
assessed positively if it manages to reproduce, at least qualitatively, the impulse-response functions 
of the VAR (see Christiano et al., 1999). 
 
Calibration appeals to the principle that a theory is better supported when it is validated using 
information that is not used in its formulation. This is a sound principle that offers a way of tackling 
problems associated with the Duhem-Quine thesis. But the acceptance of this principle, in the 
context of RBC, is not clear for for two reasons. First, as previously discussed, the collection of 
stylised facts through VARs is not an independent exercise. It is necessary to identify VARs that are 
capable of being given an economic interpretation. In order to identify a VAR, as the literature on 
the so-called structural VARs has demonstrated, one has to make appeal to some background 
knowledge, unless one uses arbitrary identification schemes like the Choleski-recursive scheme. 
The problem is that the background knowledge typically used to identify a VAR in the context of 
RBC is hardly independent of the basic assumptions of general equilibrium, perfect rationality, 
perfect aggregation and so on, which also constitute the tenets of the theoretical model to be 
calibrated. Second, all NCMs are based on the simplification of the representative agent. Thus, 
when NCMs are calibrated using parameters derived from microeconomic investigations, it is 
                                                 
16 We will return to the relationship between stylised facts and theory in section 4. 
 14tacitly assumed that aggregation does not fundamentally alter the structure of the aggregate model. 
This assumption is hard to defend, as Kirman (1992), and Forni and Lippi (1997) have shown. 
 
A key characteristic of NCM calibration is the strong commitment general equilibrium, rational 
expectations, and perfect aggregation. These are taken for granted a priori. This form of apriorism 
is even stronger than Koopman’s because it rules out likelihood-based statistical estimates of model 
parameters, which are standard in any version of the Haavelmo-Cowles methodology. This raises 
the question of how we are to judge competing calibrated models. More importantly, is there any 
possibility of a growth in knowledge if the hard core of NCM theory is immune to revision, thanks 
to the protection of the calibration methodology?
17 The issue is illustrated by the discrepancy that 
exists between NCM models designed for forecasting, and NCM models designed for policy 
evaluation. There is the widespread use of a-theoretical models such as VARs for economic 
forecasting, on the one hand, and structural (or theoretical) calibrated models for policy evaluation, 
on the other. The separation of economic forecasting from economic policy analysis “can be 
justified theoretically by realising that the forecasts arising from a structural model are just a 
function of current and past data; if this function can be estimated consistently without reference to 
the underlying theoretical models, than the resulting forecasts will have the same forecast error 
variance, to first-order asymptotically, as if this function were known” (Stock, 2001, p.31). The 
problem that arises from this discrepancy is that theoretical models built for policy analysis avoid 
forecasting and, hence, are not open to empirical falsification. Hoover observes that no guidance 
can be given on “how to proceed nor leeway to adjust assumptions, if the data are widely at 
variance with the model’s predictions. The new classical organizing principles are 
uncontradictable” (Hoover, 1994, pp.71-72). 
 
We also note that the lack of a robust empirical validation of the theoretical apparatus, coupled with 
the desire to generate sharp analytical implications (see point 4 in section 2.2), often makes it 
extremely difficult to construct models that reproduce and explain more than one stylised fact at the 
time. It has been suggested that the number of over-simplifying, ad-hoc assumptions required to 
derive an analytically solvable implication (that is in line with the observed phenomena) increases 
enormously according to the number of phenomena one would like to explain simultaneously.
18 
From labour market dynamics, to growth and development, to consumption and demand, there are 
simple neoclassical models that address just one phenomenon (or stylised fact) in isolation. We do 
not see robust models that explain a number of related phenomena (Fagiolo et. al, 2004a). This is 
true, not only in terms of the macro-dynamics, but (more dramatically) at the micro level. Consider, 
for instance, the lack of micro-macro models that jointly replicate micro stylised facts such as firm 
size, growth and productivity distributions across sectors, together with macro stylised facts 
concerning statistical properties of aggregated growth time-series. 
 
The fourth approach developed since the demise of Haavelmo-Cowles is the LSE econometric 
methodology. It is strongly at odds with the calibration methodology. As noted, that approach 
concurs with the new classical line that the key problem of Haavelmo-Cowles was that it was based 
on Keynesian theory.  By replacing Keynesian theory with new classical theory, one now has as 
basis for secure theoretical knowledge.  The LSE methodology rests on a very different view.  It  
explains the failure of Haavelmo-Cowles as a lack of rigorous statistical testing. The modelling 
strategy relies on a sequential reduction-procedure: the so-called ‘general-to-specific approach’ (see 
Cook and Hendry, 1994). The objective of this approach is the identification of a characterisation of 
                                                 
17 See point 3 among the core issues of empirical validation discussed in section 2.1. 
18 See Fagiolo et al., 2004a for a discussion and for further reading. 
 15the data that is simpler than the rwDGP, but which still retains all the important information on the 
phenomena under study.  
 
The concept of exogeneity, refined and distinguished into different categories by Engle, Hendry and 
Richard (1983), plays also a crucial role in the LSE methodology. Indeed, the dimensionality of the 
model is reduced by omitting equations for those variables for which the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity is not rejected. Furthermore, the LSE methodology stresses the importance of testing 
alternative specifications. The theory of encompassing (Hendry, 1988) serves this scope. Given any 
two competing specifications, which can be nested in a joint model, “[i]f one of the specifications is 
a valid restriction of the joint model and the other not, then the one encompasses the other” (Hoover 
2006). In the sequential reduction, at each step encompassing of a parsimonious specification is 
tested against a set of alternative specifications. 
 
The LSE methodology endorses a relationship between models and data that is far removed from 
the apriorism of Koopmans’ interpretation of Haavelmo-Cowles and, in particular, the calibration 
approach. Theory still maintains its important role of defining the range of variables that are to be 
included in the mDGP, and of suggesting the restrictions that are to be rigorously tested. In some 
ways, the LSE methodology seeks a middle ground between the structural modelling of Haavelmo-
Cowles and the a-theoretical VAR approach (Hoover 1995a). 
 
We learn four lessons from this brief excursion. First, there is no consensus within neoclassical 
economics on the most appropriate methodology for empirical validation, and the debate is still 
very much open. The Haavelmo-Cowles methodology once provided a basis for consensus and 
offered a practical means of dealing with aspects of the identification and under-determination 
problems. However, following the Lucas and Sims critiques, consensus broke down and a number 
of competing approaches to empirical validation now exist. Second, each of the alternative 
approaches currently pursued in by neoclassical economists contains a very different 
methodological position. Notably, the strongly aprioristic calibration approach stands at one end of 
the methodological spectrum, while the pluralistic LSE approach stands at the other end. Of all four 
approaches, only the LSE approach is methodologically pluralist, allowing for the comparison of 
competing theoretical models. The other approaches are, to varying degrees, aprioristic and clearly 
take neoclassical economics as the sole theoretical basis for economic modelling. Third, the 
Duhem-Quine thesis undermines econometric methodologies that do not check the robustness of the 
empirical results under variations of background assumptions. Fourth, the basic tenets of NCMs – 
continuous market clearing, representative agent, strong rationality – are never subjected to 
empirical validation. This is particularly noticeable in the calibration approach. 
 
3  Empirical Validation and Heterogeneity of AB Models 
 
As in neoclassical economics, empirical validation is carried out in very diverse ways by AB 
economists. In this and in the next section we examine this heterogeneity. We suggest that this 
heterogeneity partly depends on the fact that AB models frequently contain non-linearities, 
stochastic dynamics, non-trivial interaction structures among economic agents, and micro-macro 
feedbacks (section 1 above). The heterogeneity is also linked to the diverse structural content of the 
models, and the ways they are analysed. This is another key difference to neoclassical modelling, 
where variety is intimately associated with the diverse roles played by statistical inference. In order 
to capture the diversity of structural content (and methods of analysis) within AB economics, we 
present a taxonomy that contains four dimensions: the nature of the object(s) under study, the goal 
 16of the analysis, and the modelling assumptions. In the remainder of this section we discuss a set of 
empirical validation issues  that are particularly pressing for AB modellers. These are the alternative 
strategies for constructing empirically-based models, over-parameterisation, defining sufficiently 
strong tests for empirical validation (e.g. stylised facts, and unconditional objects), issues arising 
from the availability, quality and bias of available datasets, and the usefulness and implications of 
counterfactuals for policy guidance. 
 
Let us go return to the meta-model rwDGP vs. mDGP introduced at the beginning of section 2.1. 
The extent to which the mGDP accurately represents the rwDGP depends on many preliminary, 
model-related factors (see Fig. 1). These range from the quality of micro and macro parameters that 
are specified, to initial conditions at the micro and macro level that are taken to proxy real-world 
initial conditions. The problem of developing a good representation is compounded when discrete-
time models contain (as invariably AB models do):  
(i)   non-linearities and randomness in individual behaviours and interaction networks; 
(ii)  micro and macro variables that are governed by complicated stochastic processes 
that can hardly be analysed analytically (hence the need for computer simulation);  
(iii)  feedbacks between the micro and macro levels. 
 
Using Figure 1, let us consider one possible procedure for studying the output of an AB model. 
Suppose the modeller knows (from a preliminary simulation study, or from some ex ante 
knowledge coming from the particular structure of the AB model under study) that the real-world 
system is ergodic, and that the rwDGP displays a sufficiently stationary behaviour for a time period 
after T
* for (almost all) points of the parameter space and initial conditions. For a particular set of 
initial conditions, micro and macro parameters (i.e. θ, Θ, x0, and X0), we assume the rwDGP runs 
until it reaches some form of stable behaviour (for at least T>T
* time steps).  
 
Now suppose we are interested in a set of statistics S = {s1, s2, … }that are to be computed on the 
simulated data generated by the mDGP {xt , t=1,…, T} and {Xt, t=1,…, T }
19.  For any given run 
(m=1,2,…,M), the simulation will output a value for sj. Given the stochastic nature of the process, 
each run − and thus each value of sj − will be different from the others. Therefore, after having 
produced M independent runs, one has generated a distribution for sj containing M observations. 
This distribution can be summarised by computing, for example, its mean E(sj), its variance V(sj), 
and so on. Recall, however, that the moments will depend on the initial choices that were made for 
θ, Θ, x0, and X0. By exploring a sufficiently large number of points in the space of initial conditions 
and parameter values, and by computing E(sj),  V(sj), etc. at each point, one can gain a deep 
understanding of the behaviour of the mDGP of the model system
20. 
 
                                                 
19 For example, one of the micro variables might be an individual firm’s output and the corresponding macro variable 
may be GNP. In this case, we may be interested in aggregate statistics sj such as the average rate of growth of the 
economy over T time-steps (e.g. quarterly years). 
20 Consider the example of footnote 13 once again. One may plot E(sj), which is the Monte-Carlo mean of an 
economy’s average growth rates, against key macro parameters such as the aggregate propensity to invest in R&D. This 
may allow one to understand whether the overall performance of the economy increases in the model with that 
propensity. Moreover, non-parametric statistical tests can be conducted to see if E(sj) differs significantly in two 
extreme cases, such as high vs. low propensity to invest in R&D. 
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Figure 1. A procedure for studying the output of an AB model 
  
In any case, it is easy to see that the comparison of mDGP and rwDGP in AB models opens up a 
whole range of new methodological problems (we will consider these in the next sections). The 
bottom line is that AB modellers have in practice performed empirical validation in (sometimes 
very) diverse ways. This, we suggest, is also due to the fact that the ways in which AB models have 
been traditionally analysed (i.e. the statistical and simulation procedures that were employed) are 




The first dimension is the nature of the object(s) under study (first column of Table 1). These are 
the stylised facts (empirically observed facts) that the model is seeking to explain. Significant 
differences exist with respect to the nature of the object being studied in AB models. Where 
neoclassical modellers are interested in quantitative change, AB modellers are equally interested in 
qualitative change of economic systems themselves. For instance, there are AB models that 
investigate how R&D spending affects the qualitative nature of macroeconomic growth. Other AB 
models investigate its quantitative impact, or else seek to explain some statistically observed 
quantitative property of aggregate growth (e.g. its autocorrelation patterns). Another important 
distinction is between AB models that seek to investigate a single phenomenon, and those that 
jointly investigate multiple phenomena. For instance, a model may consider the properties of 
productivity and investment time-series, in addition to the properties of aggregate growth. Transient 
versus long-run impact is a further distinction. For example, there are AB models that examine the 
                                                 
21 Space constraints prevent us from discussing how different classes of AB models (e.g. evolutionary industry and 
growth models, history-friendly models, and ACE models) fit each single field of the entries in Table 1. See Windrum 
(2004), and Dawid (2005) for detailed discussions of this topic. 
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technology. Other AB models are only concerned with the magnitude of a technology’s long-run 
impact (when the economic system has stabilised somewhat). Finally, an important distinction 
exists between AB models that investigate micro distributions and macro aggregates. The former 
are concerned with the dynamics of industry-level distributions, such as a cross-section of firm 
productivity distributions, for a particular sector, in a particular year. The latter are concerned with 
longer time-series data for nation states, or the world economy, over a number of years.  
 
A second dimension in which AB models differ is in the goal of the analysis (second column of 
Table 1). AB models tend to deal with in-sample data. In-sample data are relevant when one is 
interested in describing or replicating observed phenomena. Out-of-sample exercises are less 
frequently carried out by AB economists. For instance, there are no examples of AB models, 
dealing with technological change and business cycles, that attempt to provide predictions of the 
out-of-sample behaviour of GDPs over given periods of time (e.g., with the goal of answering 
control-related issues). Only recently have AB models have been employed to generate policy 




A third dimension concerns the nature of the most important modelling assumptions (Table 1, third 
column
23).  Some models contain many degrees of freedom, others do not. For example, agents in 
AB models may be characterised by many variables and parameters. Their decision rules may, in 
turn, be highly-parameterised. Alternatively, agents and decision rules may be described in a very 
stylised way. Individual decision rule sets ℜi,t, and interaction structures (i.e. the graph Gt) may be 
exogenously fixed (e.g. ℜi,t=ℜi and/or Gt= G). They may change over time. Change may be driven 
by exogenous, stochastic factors. Alternatively, change may be driven by agents endogenously 
selecting new decision rules and interaction structures according to some meta-criteria (as happens 
in endogenous network formation models, see Fagiolo et al., 2004b). 
 
 
The fourth and final dimension is the methodology of analysis (Table 1, fourth column). In order to 
thoroughly assess the properties of an AB model, the researcher needs to perform a detailed 
sensitivity analysis, along the lines sketched in Figure 1. This sensitivity analysis should, at the very 
least, explore how the results depend on (i) micro-macro parameters, (ii) initial conditions, and (iii) 
across-run variability induced by stochastic elements (e.g. random initial conditions, and random 
individual decision rules). To illustrate, let us suppose the researcher is interested in the growth rate 
of an economy. Once the initial conditions (e.g. initial capital levels of firms) and the micro-macro 
parameters are fixed (e.g. the individual propensity to engage in R&D and the macroeconomic 
availability of technological opportunity), a run of the AB model will generate a single instance of 
the growth rate. Now, suppose one wants to compare the growth rate of an economy when there are 
high and low technological opportunities. It is not enough to generate a single simulation run, or to 
check the results for a single choice of micro parameters (i.e. the individual propensity to engage in 
R&D) and initial conditions (i.e. firm capital levels). On the contrary, a thorough exploration needs 
to be made of how the average macro growth rate depends on each of the elements (i)-(iii). More 
generally, sensitivity analysis entails a careful investigation of how the outputs of a model vary 
when one alters its inputs (Law and Kelton, 1991; Leombruni et al., 2006). Therefore, apart from 
                                                 
22 Also see papers presented at the recent conference ‘Agent-Based Models for Economic Policy Design’ (ACEPOL05), 
Bielefeld, June 30, 2005 - July, 2, 2005 (http://www.wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de/~dawid/acepol/).  
23 The pros and cons of this heterogeneity in modelling assumptions for AB economists were discussed in section 1 of 
this paper. Also see Richiardi (2003), Pyka and Fagiolo (2005), and Leombruni et al. (2005). 
 19sampling the space of parameters and initial conditions, researchers need to check the robustness of 
the results against changes in (i) the distribution of random variables generating noise in the system, 
(ii) timing and updating mechanisms, and (iii) level of aggregation of microeconomic variables.  
 
 
Nature of Object 
under Study 
Goal of Analysis  Modelling Assumptions  Methodology of 
Analysis 
 
•  Qualitative- 
Quantitative 
Analysis 
•  Single − Multiple 
Variables 
•  Transients vs. Long-
run Impacts 
•  Micro − Macro 
 
•  In-Sample 
(descriptive) 
•  Out-of-Sample 
o  forecasting 
o  prediction / 
control 




•  Size of the space of 
o  micro/macro 
parameters  
o  micro/macro 
variables  
o  decision rules 
 
•  Treatment of 
time/updating 
o  discrete / 
discontinuous 
o  parallel / 
asynchronous  
 
•  Type of Decision rules 
o  adaptive, myopic 
vs. optimising, 
best-reply 
o  deterministic vs. 
stochastic  
 
•  Type of Interaction 
Structure 
o  local vs. global 
o  deterministic vs. 
stochastic  
 
•  Dynamics of Decision 
Rules and Interaction 
Structures 
o  exogenously 
given/changing 
o  endogenously 
selected  
 
•  Sensitivity of results 
o  to micro/macro 
parameters 
o  to initial 
conditions 
o  ergodicity 





Table 1. Taxonomy of dimensions of heterogeneity in AB models 
 
 
These four key dimensions of heterogeneity strongly inform the choice of empirical validation 
procedure that is used. The focus on qualitative or quantitative phenomena, on micro or macro 
phenomena, and on transients or long-run impacts, determine the type of data that is required for 
empirical validation, the statistical procedures to be followed, and the ability to generate empirically 
testable implications. Additionally, the extent to which sensitivity analysis is performed prior to 
empirical validation has important implications for the universality of the simulation results that are 
obtained. Whether the analysis is a descriptive (in-sample) exercise, or seeks to generate (out-of-
sample) predictions, also necessitates different approaches to data collection and analysis. Out-of-
 20sample analysis requires the researcher to calibrate parameters and initial conditions. As discussed, 
this should be governed by empirical evidence (where it is available). 
 
4  Alternative Approaches to Empirical Validation in AB Models 
 
The previous section outlined the key dimensions along which one finds heterogeneity in AB 
models. In this section we explain, in greater detail, the nature of this heterogeneity. We review 
three of the most influential approaches to empirical validation that have been developed in the AB 
literature. These are indirect calibration approach, the Werker-Brenner approach, and the history-
friendly approach. These three approaches are strongly shaping the debate on validation in AB 
economics. Our goal is to provide a general overview of each approach, and to consider how each 
of them tackles the methodological issues discussed in sections 2 and 3. Each, in its own way, seeks 
to reduce the parameters of the model, although each does this in a different way. All seek to reduce 
the space of possible ‘worlds’ that can be explored by tying AB models to an observed empirical 
reality. The history-friendly approach constrains parameters, interactions, and decision rules in the 
model in line with the specific, empirically-observable history of a particular industry. It can be 
interpreted as a calibration exercise with respect to unique historical traces. The other two 
approaches do not impose a preliminary set of restrictions on parameters but, rather, indirectly 
employ empirical evidence to identify sub-regions in the potential parameter space. Within these 
sub-regions, a model is expected to replicate some relevant statistical regularities or stylised facts.  
 
Prior to this discussion, we need to briefly consider qualitative AB models and their contribution to 
the validation debate. There exist a significant number of AB models that engage in purely 
qualitative theorising, and which are not validated in any meaningful sense. In economics there is a 
long tradition, stretching back to the earliest classical economists, of using models as a means to 
engage in abstract gedankenexperiments. Many AB models do this. In accordance with our thesis 
on the relationship between model content and empirical validation, a significant number of AB 
models seek to explain qualitative phenomena that are intrinsically closed to quantitative analysis. 
There is no rationale for testing such models against existing empirical data sets. Notable examples 
are evolutionary game-theoretic models (Vega-Redondo, 1996), and Polya urn models (Arthur, 
1988, 1994). There is a weak relationship between the micro-macro variables/parameters of these 
models and their empirically observed counterparts. The focus of such models is the emergence of 
qualitative aggregate patterns, such as the emergence of coordination and cooperation. Forecasting 
exercises are possible but they typically generate unpredictability results. For example, one knows 
with certainty that users will lock in to one of the competing technologies in Arthur’s (1994) Polya 
urn model but it is impossible to know ex ante which of the competing technologies will be 
selected.  
 
Some AB economists, engaged in qualitative modelling, are critical of the suggestion that 
meaningful empirical validation is possible. They suggest there are inherent difficulties in trying to 
develop an empirically-based social science that is akin to the natural sciences. Socio-economic 
systems, it is argued, are inherently open-ended, interdependent and subject to structural change. 
How can one then hope to effectively isolate a specific ‘sphere of reality’, specify of all relations of 
phenomena within the sphere with the external environment, and build a model describing all 
important phenomena observed within the sphere (together with all essential influences of the 
external environment)? In the face of such difficulties, some AB modellers do not believe it is 
possible to represent the social context as vectors of quantitative variables with stable dimensions 
(Valente, 2005). 
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One possible reaction is to use the computer as an artificial laboratory in which basic, causal 
relationships can be tested in order to gain some knowledge on the underlying (much more intricate 
and convoluted) real-world causal structure. The danger of this strategy is that one ends up building 
auto-referential formalisations that have no link to reality (Edmonds and Moss, 2005). Certainly 
there are those in other social science disciplines who have taken the step of accepting they are 
constructing and analysing synthetic artificial worlds which may or may not have a link with the 
world we observe (Doran, 1997). Those taking this position open themselves to the proposition that 
a model should be judged by the criteria that are used in mathematics: i.e. precision, importance, 
soundness and generality. This is hardly the case with AB models! The majority of AB modellers 
do not go down this particular path. Instead, they employ methodological approaches that seek to 
deal with the difficult issues and problems discussed in sections 2 and 3.  
 
4.1  The Indirect Calibration Approach 
 
Advocates of qualitative simulation warn us about the problems that arise from the inherent 
structural non-stationarity and the interdependence of socio-economic systems. The points echo 
Kaldor’s discussion of stylised facts (Kaldor, 1961; Kwásnicki, 1998). In his view, the study of 
socio-economic phenomena is strongly hampered by difficulties associated with collecting large, 
detailed datasets that are sufficiently reliable for us to empirical validate our models. He suggested 
that empirical validation should be conducted on a more aggregate level, by focusing on stylised 
facts or statistical regularities. By stressing the reproduction (explanation) or prediction of a set of 
stylised facts, one hopes to circumvent problems of data availability and reliability. 
 
Drawing upon a combination of stylised facts and empirical datasets, many AB modellers have 
been developing a pragmatic four-step approach to empirical validation. In the first step, the 
modeller identifies a set of stylised facts that (s)he is interested in reproducing and/or explaining 
with a model. Stylised facts typically concern the macro-level (e.g. the relationship between 
unemployment rates and GDP growth) but can also relate to cross-sectional regularities (e.g. the 
shape of the distributions on firm size). In the second step, along with the prescriptions of the 
empirical calibration procedure, the researcher builds the model in a way that keeps the 
microeconomic description as close as possible to empirical and experimental evidence about 
microeconomic behaviour and interactions. This step entails gathering all possible evidence about 
the underlying principles that inform real-world behaviours (e.g. of firms, consumers, and 
industries) so that the microeconomic level is modelled in a not-too-unrealistic fashion. In the third 
step, the empirical evidence on stylised facts is used to restrict the space of parameters, and the 
initial conditions if the model turns out to be non-ergodic.  
 
The foregoing procedure is an exercise in ‘indirect calibration’. Suppose, for example, that the 
Beveridge curve is one of the statistical regularities being investigated. The model must be able to 
replicate a relationship in which unemployment rates decrease with vacancy rates in the labour 
market (cf. Fagiolo et al., 2004a). The researcher should restrict the further analysis to all (and only) 
parameter combinations under which the model does not reject that hypothesis (at some confidence 
level). This step is the most sensible because it involves a fine sampling of the parameter space. It is 
also computationally demanding and requires the use of Monte Carlo techniques. For any given 
point in the parameter space, one must generate a distribution for the statistics summarising the 
stylised facts of interest (e.g. the slope of the relationship between unemployment and vacancy 
 22rate), and test the null hypothesis that the empirically observed valued can be generated by our 
model under that particular parameter combination (see Figure 1). 
 
In the fourth and final step, the researcher should deepen his/her understanding of the causal 
mechanisms that underlie the stylised facts being studied and/or explore the emergence of fresh 
stylised facts (i.e. statistical regularities that are different to the stylised facts of interest) which the 
model can validate ex post. This might be done by further investigating the subspace of parameters 
that resist to the third step, i.e. those consistent with the stylised facts of interest. For example, one 
might study how the absolute value of the Monte Carlo average of the slope of the unemployment-
vacancy rate relation varies with some macro-parameter (if any) that governs wage setting and/or 
union power in the model. This can shed light on the causal mechanism underlying the emergence 
of a Beveridge curve. Similarly, one can ask whether business cycle properties (e.g. average and 
volatility of growth rates) change with the slope of the Beveridge relation. If this is the case, a fresh 
implication generated by the model (under empirically plausible parameters) can be taken to the 
data - and further provide support for the AB model under scrutiny. 
 
A stream of more recent AB contributions to the fields of industry- and market-dynamics has been 
strongly rooted in the four-step empirical validation procedure just presented. For example, Fagiolo 
and Dosi (2003) study an evolutionary growth model that is able to reproduce many stylised facts 
about output dynamics, such as I(1) patterns of GNP growth, growth-rates autocorrelation structure, 
absence of size-effects, etc., while explaining the emergence of self-sustaining growth as the 
solution of the trade-off between exploitation of existing resources and exploration of new ones. 
Similarly, Fagiolo et al. (2004a) present a model of labour and output market dynamics that is not 
only able to jointly reproduce the Beveridge curve, the Okun curve and the wage curve, but also 
relates average growth rates of the system to the institutional set-up of the labour market. 
 
Although appealing, the indirect calibration approach is open to criticism in at least two important 
respects. First, notice that no attempt is made to calibrate micro and macro parameters using their 
empirical counterparts. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, the models address in-
sample exercises. On the other hand, due to the difficulties of matching theoretical and empirical 
observations, one is bounded to be as agnostic as possible as to whether the details of a model 
(variables, parameters) can be really compared with empirically-observable ones. However, in order 
for this indirect, weak, calibration procedure to be effective, the empirical phenomena of interest 
should not be very general. Otherwise, they might not necessarily represent a difficult test for the 
model. If this is the case, the model might pass the validation procedure without providing any 
effective explanation of the phenomena of interest (e.g. no restrictions on the parameter space 
would be made). This parallels Brock’s discussion of ‘unconditional objects’. Here the fundamental 
issue of discriminating between the ‘descriptions’ and ‘explanations’ of reality pops up once more. 
 
The second problem is far subtler, and has to do with the interpretation of the points belonging to 
the sub-region of the parameter space (and initial conditions) that resist the sort of ‘exercise in 
plausibility’ that one performs in the third step of the procedure. After a suitable sub-region of the 
parameter space (and initial conditions) has been singled out - according to the capability of the 
model to replicate the set of stylised facts of interests in that sub-region - how should one interpret 
all comparative exercises that aim at understanding what happens when one tunes the parameters 
within that sub-region? For instance, suppose that one has found the range of values for the 
parameter ‘strength of union power’ which is consistent with the emergence of a Beveridge curve in 
the labour market, and is interested in asking the question: How does the average growth rate of the 
economy change when the strength of union power moves within those bounds? In all these cases, 
an interpretation problem arises: What does it really add - to our understanding of reality - 
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an evolutionary world where history, indeterminacy, and non-linear feedbacks between the micro 
and macro levels may strongly affect the outcomes? 
 
4.2  The Werker-Brenner Approach to Empirical Calibration  
 
An interesting application of empirical calibration to AB models has been proposed by Brenner and 
co-authors. The approach is discussed in Werker and Brenner (2004), and has been applied in 
Brenner and Murmann (2003), and Brenner (2004). The origins of calibration lie in Kaldor’s work 
in the 1960s. In a nutshell, the calibration approach proposes that when (as is usually the case), 
theory does not enable us to restrict the dimension space of initial conditions and micro/macro 
parameters, we should use empirical knowledge to first calibrate the dimension space, and 
thereafter use empirical knowledge to validate the resulting model specification. In this way, 
calibration uses empirical evidence to identify sub-regions of the parameter space where the model 
is able better to replicate empirically observed, statistical regularities. Where high quality datasets 
do not exist, Kaldor advocated the use of stylised facts to pin down the key parameter values or  
 ranges of values for key parameters. 
 
The Werker-Brenner approach is a three-step procedure for calibrating AB models. The first two 
steps are consistent with all calibration exercises.  The third step is novel. Step 1 uses existing 
empirical knowledge to calibrate initial conditions and the ranges of model parameters. As we have 
seen, AB models contain many dimensions, including the set of assumptions about agents’ 
behaviour, their actions, interactions, causal relationships, and the simplifying assumptions of the 
model. Werker-Brenner propose that, where sensible data are not available, the model should be left 
as general as possible, i.e. wide ranges should be specified for parameters on which there is little or 
no reliable data.  
 
Step 2 involves empirical validation of the outputs for each of the model specifications derived 
from step 1. Through empirical validation, the plausible set of dimensions within the initial 
dimension space is further reduced. As discussed in section 2, we can run the model specification 
and generate a Monte Carlo set of micro and macro time-series data for that particular combination 
of empirically-plausible parameter values. The resulting time-series data - one for each parameter 
combination - can be thought of as a particular ‘theoretical realisation’ of the model that is being 
tested. Of course, any two time-series may overlap to a large extent. This is to be expected since the 
combinations of parameter values that are being tested are likely to be similar in some dimensions, 
while different in others. Having generated a set of theoretical realisations for each model 
specification, one is able to compare these outputs with real-world data. The real-world data that we 
observe are an ‘empirical realisation’ that is generated by the rwDGP that we are trying to model. 
The Werker-Brenner approach advocates the use of Bayesian inference procedures in order to 
conduct this output validation. Each model specification is assigned a likelihood of being accepted 
based on the percentage of ‘theoretical realisations’ that are compatible with each ‘empirical 
realisation’. In this way, empirically observed realisations are used to further restrict the initial set 
of model specifications (parameter values) that are to be considered. The modeller only retains 
those parameter values (i.e. model specifications) that are associated to the highest likelihood by the 
current known facts (i.e. empirical realisations). Model specifications that conflict with current data 
are discounted. 
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interest. The aim is to find an explanation to the phenomena being studied by exploring the 
remaining set of model specifications. This is achieved through methodological ‘abduction’. 
Abduction is a process that seeks to describe and explain empirical facts in terms of their underlying 
structures (Werker and Brenner, 2004). In practice, this involves a further validation exercise for all 
empirical realisations that can be collected. Here, though, the modeller focuses on the shared 
properties and the characteristics shared by all surviving model specifications in order to identify 
the invariant properties of the underlying structural model. The authors argue that “these [shared] 
characteristics can be expected to hold also for the real systems (given the development of the 
model has not included any crucial and false premises)” (Werker and Brenner, 2004, p.13). If the 
characteristics within a group of model specifications differ, then this also offers important insights. 
“It can be examined which factors in the model are responsible for the differences. Hence, although 
we will not know the characteristics of the real systems in this case, we will obtain knowledge about 
which factors cause different characteristics” (Werker and Brenner, 2004, p.13). 
 
The Werker-Brenner approach is attractive in a number of respects. First, it addresses head-on many 
of the issues of model evaluation: it offers a means of reducing the degree of freedom in models, it 
advocates testing procedures for sensitivity analysis on large numbers of simulations, and it 
proposes the application of well-established Bayesian inference procedures for establishing rigorous 
empirical tests for both model parameters and outputs. It also avoids a number of the potential 
pitfalls associated with developing models based on single histories (like in the history-friendly 
approach). Second, it appears to offer a powerful methodology for developing rigorous, 
empirically-grounded simulation models; models that explicitly take into account competing 
theories and assumptions. 
 
As with all approaches, there are strengths and weaknesses to empirical calibration. Let us consider 
some important methodological and operational issues associated with calibration. These, we hasten 
add, are not specific to Werker-Brenner, but are generic to all calibration approaches. To start with, 
there is a strong tendency for calibration to influence the types of models that we develop. There is 
a tendency to build models with ingredients that are readily calibrated (Chattoe, 2002). This is 
because empirically calibrated models force the researcher to focus on variables and parameters that 
can be measured in reality. Yet, there exist many. There is tendency to focus on dimensions that are 
readily calibrated and, at the same time, to exclude dimensions that are not easily calibrated. This 
has important implications for the micro-parameters of a model, particularly the behavioural aspects 
of individual agents and interactions between agents. For instance, the mental models that agents 
use to make their decisions are an important component in many AB economics models, but the 
mental models used by real world agents tend to be unobservable in practice, and so not open to 
empirical calibration. The net result is that calibration tends to induce the modeller to either abstract 
from the micro features of the economy, or to force calibration of those parameters employing 
unreliable or inconsistent data. Calibration also affects the types of model outputs that one focuses 
upon. Again, there is a temptation to focus on outputs that are readily measured, and not to consider 
phenomena that cannot be measured or calibrated a priori. This might end up in models that are 
only able to replicate the reality, but unable to predict or give insight into the search for novel 
phenomena. 
 
Another issue is the availability of quality of available empirical data. Effective calibration requires 
a wealth of high quality data. Indeed, the Werker-Brenner calibration approach is particularly 
demanding as it requires the modeller to engage in two rounds of empirical validation. 
Unfortunately, in economics (and in the other social sciences, for that matter) empirical data are 
always scarce while the capacity of economists to generate new theories is almost infinite. There are 
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raw data, processing this raw data, and constructing organised datasets. The organisation and 
construction of national and international datasets depends on the existence of specialist statistical 
offices.  Even then, high costs mean that national and international statistical offices are not able to 
collect data on all matters.  
 
A second reason for limited datasets is the bias that is inherent to the collection process. People who 
collect data are informed by existing theory on the data to be collected. Established theory not only 
informs choices about which variables to measure (and not to measure), but also how to measure 
the selected variables - i.e. the key indicators to be used. Hence, there is an inherent tendency to 
maintain the status quo and to lock out new, alternative concepts, theories and models. For new 
ideas to succeed in economics, new datasets may be required in order to test new theories and 
models. Perhaps the best-known example of this is the Keynesian revolution. Theoretical 
developments went hand-in-hand with the collection of aggregate national data for the first time, 
notably on household consumption expenditure and firm investment expenditure. We shall return to 
issues of bias and incompleteness of existing datasets in a moment, for now we observe that this is 
highly problematic for calibration. Furthermore, the most common reason for under-determination 
in economics is the bias and incompleteness the available datasets. It is not always possible to 
exclude a particular model on the basis of existing empirical data because other types of data can 
potentially support the model, if they had been collected.  
 
A third reason for incomplete data may lie in the nature of the phenomenon that is being observed. 
The phenomena may be rarely observed, or is a unique event that is non-reproducible. The issue is 
widely discussed in statistics texts. The practical upshot is that, while in principle we could generate 
as many theoretical observations as we like, in practice we may only have a few of such empirical 
realisations (possibly only one!). If we believe that the empirical observations come from an 
underlying DGP that could have been ‘played twice’ (i.e. could have generated alternative 
observations, other than the one we have) the problem of comparing simulated with empirical data 
becomes very complicated. We will return to this issue in section 4.3. 
 
A further generic issue highlighted by calibration is the nature of the relationship between the 
model mDGP and the real-world rwDGP. First, there is the question of whether the rwDGP is 
ergodic or non-ergodic. If the underlying real-world rwDGP is thought to be non-ergodic (as well as 
the theoretical mDGP described in the AB model), then initial conditions matter. This raises a 
whole host of problems for the modeller. The modeller needs to identify the ‘true’ set of initial 
conditions in the empirical data, generated by the rwDGP, in order to correctly set the initial 
parameters of the model. Even if perfect data exists (which is unlikely), this is a very difficult task. 
How far in the past does one need to in order to identify the correct set initial values for the relevant 
micro and macro variables? There is a possibility of infinite regress. If this is the case, then one may 
need data stretching back a very long time, possibly before data started to be collected.  
 
Even when the mDGP and rwDGP are thought to be (sufficiently) stationary processes, the problem 
of correctly setting t0 remains. An important decision to make is about the particular sub-sample of 
simulated data (of length τ = tn−t0) that is to be compared with the empirical data. The underlying 
rwDGP may generate a number of different regimes, e.g. the same macroeconomic structure may 
generate a diverse set of outcomes that include economic depression, full employment, inflation, 
hyper-inflation, and even stagflation. If this is the case, then one is faced with the problem of which 
sub-sample of simulated and observed time-series should be compared in order to carry out model 
validation. By incorrectly setting time t0 in the model, one can generate a set of simulated output 
data that describes a different regime to that found in the empirical data. In addition to the issue of 
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runs, i.e. to correctly set tn. If tn is set incorrectly then the simulated data may include multiple 
regimes that are covered by the empirical data. If the start or end points (or both) for the simulation 
runs are incorrectly set, there is the danger that one incorrectly rejects a ‘true’ model on the basis of 
its simulated outputs. We should also note that if, as is frequently the case, the modeller sets the 
simulation runs to end at a point where the model reaches a stationary or almost stationary 
behaviour, one is implicitly assuming that the empirical evidence comes from a stationary DGP. 
This may, or may not, be the case
24. 
 
What if the observed micro and macro parameters are time dependent? One needs to be sure that the 
empirically estimated parameters that we assume are slow changing variables (and, hence, can 
reasonably treat as fixed within the timescale explored by the model) are not actually time 
dependent. If they are, then the researcher needs to go back and rethink the structural relationships 
between slow and fast variables, the timescale of the model
25, or both. 
 
Finally, issues of prediction and counterfactuals are core to calibration. To what extent do the 
predictions of the models take into account data that lies outside the current regime? Here the Lucas 
critique comes to the fore once again. Real economic agents not only use statistical processes based 
on past experience (adaptive expectations) but use data to project into the future. In this way, agents 
are able to respond to exogenous economic shocks. As discussed in section 2.2.1, this was the basis 
for the rational expectations critique of Keynesian behavioural models. Exogenous economic 
shocks alter behaviours but leave the underlining structure unchanged. As a consequence Keynesian 
theories seriously mispredict the consequences of a shock, whereas a model of the micro 
fundamentals - individual production functions and utility functions - would not. 
 
 
To sum up, calibration addresses the over-parameterisation problem by reducing the space of 
possible ‘worlds’ that are explored in an AB model (Kwásnicki, 1998). This is done through the use 
of empirical data, such that the model mDGP resembles as closely as possible the actual rwDGP 
that we observe. This can be a sensible goal whenever the analysis aims to forecast the future or 
generate policy implications. However, on the down side, calibration has a strongly conservative 
tendency. It supports the continuation of orthodox theories and models for which empirical data are 
readily available. It disadvantages new theories and new models for which empirical research has 
not yet caught up, and mitigates against the study of qualitative phenomena that are either difficult 
to measure or are inherently immeasurable by their very nature. We have also discussed the 
numerous practical problems involved in actually carrying out calibration exercises. A notable 
problem is the availability of high-quality data in sufficient quantities over the many parameters of 
a typical AB model. Even if this is achieved, the modeller faces a range of problems such as 
knowing ex ante whether the real-world system being modelled is ergodic or non-ergodic, and the 
ability to correctly set the initial conditions of the model, plus the beginning and end points of the 
simulation runs, to match that of the real-world system captured in the empirical dataset(s). Such 
requirements are far from trivial!  
 
                                                 
24 See for example the calibration exercises performed by Bianchi et al. (2005) on the CATS model developed in a 
series of papers by Gallegati et al. (2003, 2005). 
25 An important issue related to time-scales in AB models, which we shall just mention here, concerns the choice made 
about the timing in the model. Whether we assume that the time-interval [t, t+1] describes a day, or a quarter, or a year 
(and whether one supposes that the ‘updating scheme’ is asynchronous or parallel), has non-trivial consequences for 
calibration and empirical validation. 
 274.3  The History-Friendly Approach  
 
The history-friendly approach offers an alternative solution to the problem of over-parameterisation. 
Like the calibration approaches discussed above, it seeks to bring modelling more closely ‘in line 
with the empirical evidence’ and thereby constrains the analysis to reduce the dimensionality of a 
model. The key difference is that this approach uses the specific historical case studies of an 
industry to model parameters, agent interactions, and agent decision rules. In effect, it is a 
calibration approach which uses particular historical traces in order to calibrate a model. 
 
In part, the history-friendly approach represents an attempt to deal with criticisms levelled at early 
neo-Schumpeterian AB models of technological change. Two of the key protagonists of history-
friendly modelling, Richard Nelson and Sydney Winter, were founding fathers of neo-
Schumpeterian AB modelling. While the early models were much more micro-founded and 
empirically-driven than contemporary neoclassical models, empirical validation was weak. There 
was a lack of thorough sensitivity and validation checks and empirical validation, when carried out, 
tended to consist of little more than a cursory comparison of outputs generated by a just a handful of 
simulation runs with some very general stylised facts. Further, the early models contained many 
dimensions and so it was rather easy to generate a few outputs that matched some very general 
observations (the over-parameterisation problem)
26. 
 
In terms of our taxonomy, the history-friendly approach is strongly quantitative and mainly focuses 
on microeconomic transients (industrial paths of development). In this approach a ‘good’ model is 
one that can generate multiple stylised facts observed in an industry. The approach has been 
developed in a series of papers. Key amongst these is Malerba et al. (1999), and Malerba and 
Orsenigo (2001). In the first of these papers, the authors outlined the approach and then applied it to 
a discussion of the transition in the computer industry from mainframes to desktop PCs. In the 
second of these papers, the approach was applied to the pharmaceutical industry and the role of 
biotech firms therein. Here we shall keep the description of the approach succinct
27. Through the 
construction of industry-based AB models, detailed empirical data on an industry informs the AB 
researcher in model building, analysis and validation. Models are to be built upon a range of 
available data, from detailed empirical studies to anecdotal evidence to histories written about the 
industry under study. This range of data is used to assist model building and validation. It should 
guide the specification of agents (their behaviour, decision rules, and interactions), and the 
environment in which they operate. The data should also assist the identification of initial 
conditions and parameters on key variables likely to generate the observed history. Finally, the data 
are to be used to empirically validate the model by comparing its output (the ‘simulated trace 
history’) with the ‘actual’ history of the industry. It is the latter that truly distinguishes the history-
friendly approach from other approaches. Previous researchers have used historical case studies to 
guide the specification of agents and environment, and to identify possible key parameters. The 
authors of the history-friendly approach suggest that, through a process of backward induction one 
can arrive at the correct set of structural assumptions, parameter settings, and initial conditions. 
Having identified the correct set of ‘history-replicating parameters’, one can carry on and conduct 
sensitivity analysis to establish whether (in the authors’ words) ‘history divergent’ results are 
possible. 
 
                                                 
26 See Windrum (1999) for a detailed discussion of early neo-Schumpeterian models. 
27 Interested readers are directed to Windrum (2004) for a detailed critique of history-friendly modelling. 
 28There are many points here that deserve closer inspection. Let us begin with issues that concern the 
structure of the model and the object of analysis. First, the modelling activity that has been 
conducted is, in practice, informed by the history of a few, key companies rather than the history of 
an entire industry. For instance, Malerba et al. (1999) is calibrated to capture one particular 
computer company – IBM − rather than the entire industry. This severely restricts the universality 
of the model. As a consequence, the micro-economic description of the supply-side of the industry 
is highly stylised. The demand-side of the computer industry model is also highly stylised. Indeed, 
many of the behavioural assumptions made about the supply and demand sides do not appear to be 
driven by industry-specific empirical observations. Windrum (2004) suggests that this reflects 
practical difficulties in collecting sufficient amounts of high quality data at the industry level.  
 
This leads us to an important question: to what extent can one hope to acquire all the relevant data 
needed to build an empirically sound industry-level model? If this is not possible, then a further 
question follows: what are we to do if the empirical evidence is incomplete, offers no guidance on a 
particular point, or else seems to contain alternative, competing viewpoints? 
 
Finally, limited attention is given to sensitivity analysis in the history friendly models, as 
parameters and rules are supposed to be deduced from the industry under study. The lack of 
sensitivity analysis is particularly noticeable with regards to cross-run variability. 
 
Aside from the issues relating to implementation, the history-friendly approach raises a set of 
fundamental methodological issues. First, the approach to empirical validation that is advocated 
involves comparing the output traces of a simulated model with detailed empirical studies of the 
actual trace history of an economic system. We are immediately confronted, once again, with 
problems associated with comparing individual output traces generated by the model mDGP with 
individual traces generated by the real-world rwDGP. This does not move us much further on from 
ascertaining whether a model is ‘capable’ of generating an output trace that resembles an 
empirically observed trace. It is not a very strong test. An individual simulated trace may, or may 
not, be typical of the model.  
 
Second, another problem concerns the ability to backwardly induce the ‘correct’ set of structural 
assumptions, parameter settings, or initial conditions from a set of traces – even if we have a model 
that generates an appropriate distribution of output traces. Simply stated, there are, in principle, a 
great many combinations of alternative parameter settings that can produce an identical output 
trace. We cannot deduce which combination of parameter settings is correct, let alone the 
appropriate set of structural assumptions. 
 
Third, the method implies that we are able to construct counterfactual histories (although the 
authors do not themselves engage in this in their papers). For example, we need to be able to 
construct a world in which IBM did not enter the PC market. This poses a very serious question. 
Could the PC market have developed in much the same way had IBM not invented the PC? Can we 
meaningfully construct a counterfactual history? As Cowan and Foray (2002) discuss, it is 
exceedingly difficult in practice to construct counterfactual histories because economic systems are 
stochastic, non-ergodic, and structurally evolve over time (more on that in Section 4.4).  
 
Fourth, there is a key methodological question related to the meaning of history: To what extent can 
we actually rely on history to be the final arbiter of theoretical and modelling debates? To pose the 
question another way, can simulations, in principle, be guided by history? In practice, it is unlikely 
that we will be able to appeal to history, either to bear witness, or to act as a final arbiter in a 
 29dispute. This is because history itself is neither simple nor uncontested, and any attempt to develop 
a historically based approach to modelling faces deep level methodological problems
28.  
 
The development of high quality accounts, open to critical scrutiny, is essential to the history-
friendly approach (and indeed any other historically based methodology). It is, after all, on the basis 
of these accounts that guidance is taken on particular modelling choices, on parameter testing, and 
output evaluation. In recognising the limitations of any historical account, we simultaneously 
identify the limitations of decisions based on that account. But this is a strength, not a weakness, of 
open academic discourse. How, then, are we to proceed? Let us suggest the following possibility. 
While a single ‘typical’ history may not exist, we may be able to draw some generalisations on the 
basis of a large collection of historical case studies. To use an analogy used by Jerry Silverberg, 
rather than seeking to develop a model that describes the fall of one particular leaf from a tree (the 
history friendly approach), we should seek to develop general models, such as the bromide diffusion 
model in physics, that can be used to explain the fall of many leaves from many trees (and other 
phenomena). To get to this point, what is needed is the construction of high quality datasets. A 
wealth of empirical studies within the neo-Schumpeterian tradition, written over the last twenty 
years, can be drawn upon. It is also likely that new databases will be needed to be constructed in 
order to develop greater understanding of micro, meso, and macro phenomena. We shall return to 
this issue later. For the moment, it is important to observe that modellers need to ensure they do not 
prematurely restrict their models, given the lack of high quality data that currently exists. If the AB 
models that are developed are not flexible enough to consider alterative scenarios, then we will be 
left with a set of models that are less, not more, compatible with one another. 
 
5  Conclusions: Open-ended issues for empirically validating AB models 
In this paper, we have critically examined some of the most prominent issues in the empirical 
validation of agent-based simulation models.  
 
We began by defining the methodological basis of empirical validation (section 2.1). The modeller 
tries to approximate a real-world DGP (rwDGP) that generates a set of observed data. The model 
contains a theoretical DGP (mDGP), which is simpler that the rwDGP, that generates a set of 
simulated outputs. The extent to which the mDGP is a good representation of the rwDGP is 
evaluated by comparing the simulated outputs of the mDGP with the real-world observations of the 
rwDGP. The paper has identified a set of key issues associated with that this process of backwards-
induction. These are (1) the isolation of the right set of mechanisms, forces and causal relations 
going on in the rwDGP; (2) the balance between instrumentalist and realist approaches; (3) the 
choice of a pluralist or apriorist methodological view; (4) the solution of the trade-off between 
analytical tractability and descriptive accuracy; (5) the way the identification / under-determination 
problem is tackled; and, finally, (6) the possibility of testing and falsifying any single hypothesis in 
isolation, especially when the phenomena under study undergo several structural changes. These 
issues are generic in empirical validation, and so apply to neoclassical and AB economists alike. 
 
Section 2.2 provided an extensive examination of how neoclassical economics has been dealing 
with these issues. The breakdown of the consensus that was based on the Cowles Commission 
                                                 
28 A well-known example of the contestability of history is evidenced by the ongoing debate about whether inferior 
quality variants can win standards battles (Leibowitz and Margolis, 1990; Arthur, 1988). As Carr (1961) observed in his 
classic work, however, history can be contestable at more fundamental and unavoidable levels. 
 30approach has led to the development of four alternative, and competing, methodologies: (1) the 
structural modelling approach, (2) vector autoregressive models (VARs), (3) calibration; and (4) the 
London School of Economics (LSE) approach. Each approach holds a (very) different 
methodological position with respect to the six key issues.  
 
Against this background, section 3 began the discussion of how empirical validation is carried out 
within the AB community. A discrete set of approaches, not only different with each other but 
different to those developed within neoclassical economics, have been developed by the AB 
community. We suggested there are two reasons for this. First, AB modellers are interested in 
phenomena such non-linearities, stochastic dynamics, non-trivial interactions among agents, and 
feedbacks from the micro to the macro level. These are not amenable to traditional equilibrium 
modelling approaches and tools. One of the consequences is that AB modellers face an additional 
set of issues/problems that are not faced by neoclassical modellers. Second, and relatedly, the 
highly diverse structural content of AB models means they need to be analysed in very different 
ways. We have presented a novel taxonomy that maps out the key areas in which AB researchers 
differ. These are the nature of the object under study (i.e. of the stylised fact(s) under analysis), the 
goal of the analysis (in-sample vs. out-of-sample), the nature of the main modelling assumptions 
(e.g. parameters, decision rules, interaction, and timing), and the methodology of the analysis (i.e. 
sensitivity exercises). Having identified the nature and causes of heterogeneity of empirical 
validation, section 4 summarised three important approaches within AB economics: indirect 
calibration, the Werker-Brenner approach to empirical calibration, and the history-friendly 
approach. 
 
In this, the final section of the paper, we draw together these various elements of the discussion. We 
present a taxonomy that captures the dimensions along which the indirect calibration, Werker-
Brenner, and history-friendly approaches differ. We end with a discussion of the unresolved issues 
that require future attention by the AB community.  
 
The taxonomy (Table 3) identifies four dimensions in which the indirect calibration, Werker-
Brenner, and history-friendly approaches differ. First, there is the domain of application. The direct 
and indirect calibration approaches can, in principle, be applied to micro and macro AB models 
(e.g. to describe the dynamics of firms, industries, and countries). By contrast, the history-friendly 
approach only addresses micro dynamics. A second dimension of heterogeneity is the type of 
empirical observations (data) that are used for empirical validation. In addition to empirical 
datasets, the Brenner-Werker approach advocates the use of historical knowledge.  The history-
friendly approach allows one to employ casual and anecdotic knowledge as well. The third 
dimension is the way in which data are actually used. All three approaches use data to assist model 
building, as well as validating the validation of the simulated outputs of models. Unlike the other 
two approaches, indirect calibration does not directly employ data to calibrate initial conditions and 
parameters. The fourth dimension is the order in which validation and calibration is performed. 
Both the Werker-Brenner and the history-friendly approaches first perform calibration and then 
validation. By contrast, the indirect calibration approach first performs validation, and then 
indirectly calibrates the model by focusing on the parameters that are consistent with output 
validation.  
 
As a result of this heterogeneity, the outcomes of the three approaches may differ. Furthermore, our 
overview not only highlights problems associated with each approach, it also brings to light a set of 
core  issues that affect all the approaches and which (so far) remain unresolved. These can be 
fruitfully classified under the following headings: 
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1.  alternative strategies for constructing empirically-based models; 
2.  problems that arise as a consequence of over-parameterisation in AB models; 
3.  debates over the definition of sufficiently strong empirical tests (including issues arising 
from the replication of stylised facts, comparison with unique real-world observations, and 
the issue of unconditional objects); 
4.  issues arising from the availability, quality and bias of available datasets; and  




Approach Domain of Application  Which kind of data should 
one employ? 





- Micro (industries, 
markets) 
- Macro (countries, world 
economy) 
- Empirical data  
 
- Assisting in model 
building 
- Validating simulated 
output 







- Micro (industries, 
markets) 
- Macro (countries, world 
economy) 
- Empirical data  
- Historical knowledge 
- Assisting in model 
building 
- Calibrating initial 
conditions and 
parameters  
- Validating simulated 
output 







- Micro (industries, 
markets) 
- Empirical data  
- Casual, historical and 
anecdotic knowledge 
- Assisting in model 
building  
- Calibrating initial 
conditions and 
parameters 
- Validating simulated 
output 




Table 2. Taxonomy of dimensions of heterogeneity in ABM empirical validation approaches 
 
 
Let us draw the paper to a close by discussing these open issues.  To begin with, there is the crucial 
issue of whether (and how) one should build an AB model that is based on empirical observations. 
Methodological realism, as discussed, embodies the principle that a model should (in addition to 
other criteria) be judged on the ‘realism’ of its assumptions. An assumption has a higher degree of 
realism when supported by robust empirical evidence (Kagel and Roth, 1995; Plott and Smith, 
1998). In other words, the model mDGP should capture the key observed features of the real-world 
rwDGP. But there is intense debate about the best way to actually construct empirically-based 
models, and to select between alternative models. What happens, for instance, if there are 
alternative assumptions and existing empirical data does not assist in choosing between them? This 
is the under-determination problem in a new context.  
 
A number of different strategies exist for selecting assumptions in the early stages of model 
building
29. One strategy is to start with the simplest possible model, and then proceed to complicate 
the model step-by-step. This is the KISS strategy: ‘Keep it simple, stupid!’. A very different 
strategy is the KIDS strategy: ‘Keep it descriptive, stupid!’. Here one begins with the most 
descriptive model one can imagine, and then simplify it as much as possible. The third strategy, 
                                                 
29 See Mäki (1994), Edmonds and Moss (2005), Pyka and Fagiolo (2005). 
 32common amongst neoclassical economists, is TAPAS: Take A Previous model and Add 
Something’. Here one takes an existing model and successively explores the assumption space 
through incremental additions and/or the relaxation of initial assumptions.  
 
Whatever the strategy employed, the AB modeller often faces an over-parameterisation problem. 
AB models with realistic assumptions and agent descriptions invariably contain many degrees of 
freedom. First, the model may contain a large number of micro-macro parameters. Second, the 
modeller may explore different interaction setups and agent decision rules. While the latter can 
reasonably be considered a modelling choice (justified by the particular issue under study), the 
former is a dimension that is often non-reducible. This is true, even if one adopts a KISS approach 
to model building and model selection. There are two aspects to the over-parameterisation problem. 
Firstly, the dimensions of the model may be so numerous that it can generate any result. If this is 
the case, then the explanative potential of the model is little better than a random walk. Secondly, 
the causal relations between assumptions and results become increasingly difficult to study the 
more degrees of freedom there are in the model. The over-parameterisation of a model (in the 
spaces of micro-macro parameters, variables, and/or decision rules) can seriously impair any 
validation or calibration exercise because there are a number of different combinations of parameter 
settings that can produce the same output. Since the parameter space describes all possible regimes 
(behavioural, technological, institutional, etc.) in which an economic system can find itself, 
discriminating among the different combinations means choosing among possible realities. Which 
one should then be compared with the empirical evidence?  
 
We have discussed a number of escape strategies for these problems. First, one can use empirical 
evidence to restrict the degrees of freedom, by directly calibrating initial conditions and/or 
parameters (i.e. the set of possible ‘worlds’ modelled by the mDGP). Second, one can indirectly 
calibrate the model by focussing on the subspace of parameters and initial conditions under which 
the model is able to replicate a set of stylised facts. Unfortunately, this procedure still tends to leave 
the modeller with multiple possible ‘worlds’. The modeller needs to address the issue of how the 
remaining worlds should be interpreted. What does it mean when one is comparing the model 
outputs that are generated under alternative sets of initial conditions/parameters that resist 
direct/indirect calibration? In fact, each combination represents a different economy or world, as it 
defines a different institutional, technological, market/industry and behavioural setup.  
 
The issue is particularly relevant for the indirect calibration approach because it is frequently the 
case that many combinations of parameters and initial conditions are consistent with the set of 
stylised facts of interest. In the direct calibration approach the modeller also finds her/himself in a 
situation where many parameters and/or initial conditions cannot be directly estimated. Contrasting 
the output of any two alternative setups − as is often done with the direct and indirect calibration 
approaches  − means one must perform comparative dynamics exercises. Such exercises are 
informative from a theoretical point of view because they allow for a better understanding of the 
properties of the model. However the interpretation of the results is unclear as far as policy 
prediction is concerned. 
 
The interpretation of alternative points in the space of parameters/initial conditions brings us to 
another question faced by AB modellers. How does one interpret the counterfactual outputs 
generated by a model? It is tempting to suggest that outputs which do not accord with empirical 
observations are counterfactuals, and that the study of these counterfactuals are useful for policy 
analysis. Cowan and Foray (2002) discuss the issue at length. They suggest that it is exceedingly 
difficult, in practice, to construct counterfactual histories because economic systems are stochastic, 
 33non-ergodic, and structurally evolve over time. As AB models typically include all these elements 
in their structure, Cowan and Foray argue that using (evolutionary) AB models to address 
counterfactual-like questions may well be misleading. The critique may also apply to the 
interpretation of empirically plausible parameters and initial conditions. In light of the Cowan-
Foray critique, one must consider whether any comparative dynamics exercises be informative. 
 
More generally, comparing the outputs generated by AB models with real-world observations 
involves a set of very intricate issues. For example, Windrum (2004) observes that the uniqueness 
of historical events sets up a whole series of problems. In order to move beyond the study of 
individual traces, we need to know if the distribution of output traces generated by the model 
mDGP approximates the actual historical traces generated by the rwDGP under investigation. A 
way to circumvent the uniqueness problem is to employ a strong invariance assumption on the 
rwDGP, thereby pooling data that should otherwise be considered a set of unique observations. For 
example, one typically supposes that cross-country aggregate output growth rates come from the 
same DGP. Similarly, it is supposed that the process that driving firm growth does not change 
across industries or time (up to some mean or variance scaling). This allows one to build cross-
section and time-series panel data.  
 
Unfortunately we cannot know if the suppositions are valid. But this is often not possible in 
practice. Consider the following example. Suppose the rwDGP in a particular industry does not 
change over time (i.e. it is ergodic). Even if this is the case, we do not typically observe the entire 
distribution of all observations but rather a very limited set of observations – possibly only one, 
unique roll of the dice. The actual history of the industry we observe is only one of a set of possible 
worlds. So how do we know that the actual historical trace is in any sense ‘typical’ (statistically 
speaking) of the potential distribution? If we do not know this, then we have nothing against which 
to compare the distributions generated by our model. We cannot determine what is typical, and 
what is atypical.  
 
We see that defining a strong empirical test for an AB model can be a very thorny problem. A 
common criticism of early models of technological change (in the Nelson-Winter tradition) was that 
they were not given sufficiently strong tests. In effect, they were evaluated on the basis of whether 
they were capable of generating outputs that resembled very general, macro observations. The 
models were not subject to rigorous testing procedures, either for model variables or model outputs. 
Indeed, it was very common to find that authors had not engaged in any form of sensitivity analysis 
but rather provided illustrative outputs from just a handful of simulation runs.  
 
The fundamental difficulties in defining strong tests for model outputs is highlighted by Brock’s 
(1999) discussion of ‘unconditional objects’ in economics (another aspect of the under-
determination problem). Empirical regularities need to be handled with care because we only have 
information on the properties of stationary distributions. The data that we observe does not provide 
information on the dynamics of the stochastic processes that actually generated them. Therefore, 
replication does not necessary imply explanation. For example, many evolutionary growth models 
can generate similar outputs on differential growth-rates between countries, technology leadership 
and catch-up, even though they differ significantly with respect to the behaviour and learning 
procedures of agents, and in their causal mechanisms (Windrum, 2004). Similarly, the Nelson and 
Winter (1982) model replicates highly aggregated data on time paths for output (GDP), capital and 
labour inputs, and wages (labour share in output), but these outputs can also be replicated by 
conventional neoclassical growth models. In the same vein, there might be many different 
stochastic processes (and therefore industry dynamic models) that are able to generate, as a 
stationary state, a power-law distribution for the cross-section firm size distribution.  
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Although one may be unable to narrow down a single model, we may be able to learn about the 
general forces at work, and to restrict the number of models that can generate a set of statistical 
regularities (Brock, 1999). Therefore, as long as the set of stylised facts to be jointly replicated is 
sufficiently large, any ‘indirect’ validation could be sufficiently informative, because it can 
effectively help in restricting the set of all stochastic processes that could have generated the data 
displaying those stylised facts. Another way out the conditional objects critique would be to not 
only validate the macro-economic output of the model, but also its micro-economics structure, e.g. 
agents’ behavioural rules
30. This requires one to only include in the model individual decision rules 
(e.g. learning) that have been validated by experimental/empirical evidence. Of course, this would 
require highly detailed and reliable data about microeconomic variables, possibly derived from 
extensive laboratory experiments. 
 
This points us to a final core issue for AB modellers; the availability, quality and bias of available 
datasets. Empirically-based modelling depends on high quality datasets. Unfortunately, the datasets 
that exist are invariably pre-selected. Not all potential records are retained; some are fortuitously 
bequeathed by the past but others are not captured. The datasets that do exist are invariably biased. 
Datasets are constructed according to criteria that reflect certain choices and, as a consequence, 
have inbuilt biases. As econometricians know only too well, it may simply be the case that data that 
would have assisted in a particular discussion has simply not been collected. Such problems exist 
with data from the recent past, just as they do for data from the more distant past. Further, linking to 
a point raised in section 2, econometrics is influenced by prevailing theoretical orthodoxy. As a 
consequence, it is very difficult to test data on new, alternative theories because suitable data are not 
available. The most famous example of this is the Keynesian revolution. Theoretical developments 
following the publication of Keynes’ General Theory could not be tested, or put into policy practice 
until government agencies started to collect aggregate national data, notably on household 
consumption expenditure and firm investment expenditure. The data that had been collected up to 
this point had been informed by pre-Keynesian economic theory. 
 
One of the main reasons why AB models have been developed is to provide significant answers to 
empirically observed puzzles that are unable to be solved within the neoclassical paradigm (see e.g. 
Dosi et al., 1994). AB models have been extremely successful in this task. Moreover, they have 
been able to explain how some crucial macroeconomic phenomena can be generated by the 
evolving networks of interactions among boundedly-rational agents in economies where the 
fundamentals may endogenously evolve over time. Examples range from growth and development 
patterns, to industry and market dynamics, to technological innovation, to the evolution of 
consumption and demand. What is more, they did so by taking on board methodological pluralism 
and avoiding the apriorist view that characterizes neoclassical economics. However, the ways in 
which AB models deal with empirical data still suffer from too much heterogeneity. Some of this 
heterogeneity can be traced back to the same causes that also affect empirical validation approaches 
in neoclassical economics (and ultimately in all social sciences). Our analysis has identified two 
directions that can be fruitfully pursued. First, a commonly accepted, minimal protocol for the 
analysis of AB models must be developed and agreed upon (also see Leombruni (2002) and 
Leombruni et al. (2006). This would allow AB models to become more comparable and reach 
methodologically sounder conclusions. Second, much more work needs to be done to address the 
core issues of empirical validation. We believe that the recent trend, which seems to highlight an 
                                                 
30 This point was made by John Duffy in his plenary talk at the 2005 International Workshop on “Agent-Based Models 
for Economic Policy Design” (ACEPOL05) in Bielefeld (Germany). Also see Gilbert (2004). 
 35increasingly growing interest in methodological issues within the AB community, is an optimistic 
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